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THE NETWORK UTILITY
KEVIN WERBACH†
Barring unforeseen obstacles, an on-line interactive computer
service, provided commercially by an information utility, may be as
commonplace by 2000 A.D. as telephone service is today.
—Martin Greenberger1

ABSTRACT
The rise of cloud computing, which involves remote networkbased applications and storage, is shifting the balance in the data
world from distributed edge systems to centralized networked
platforms. This emerging paradigm bears a striking resemblance to
the computer utility, a widespread vision among technologists in the
1960s. The way the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
grappled with the convergence of computing and communications in
that period shaped the trajectory of both industries. Technology and
market structure have changed dramatically, but the basic regulatory
issues remain: networked computers need access to communications
utilities, and networked computing platforms can themselves function
as public utilities. The FCC must return to and update its original
convergence agenda. As the technical predictions of 1960s visionaries
become real, the policy considerations they raised must also be taken
seriously.
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INTRODUCTION
Midway through the twentieth century, two great technologies,
the telecommunications network and the computer, embarked on a
collision course. Experts in the 1960s speculated about a “computer
utility” that would profoundly influence both business and society.
Not long after, the FCC began to grapple with this convergence of
computing and communications. The FCC’s actions in the late 1960s
and early 1970s shaped the future of both industries and ultimately
set in motion the current debate about Internet regulation. Both the
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regulator and the parties arguing before it understood in the 1960s
that networked data processing raised two kinds of issues: computers
as users of communications and computers as a form of
communication. The FCC chose to quarantine data processing from
regulated telecommunications, rather than tackle the public policy
considerations of the nascent computer utility directly. The
spectacular success of the information technology sector over the
2
subsequent forty years shows the wisdom of that decision.
The twenty-first century is an era of networks. There are now
two billion Internet users and five billion mobile phone subscribers—
3
a degree of connectivity unprecedented in human history. Facebook
has over five hundred million members, many of whom spend hours
4
every day on the social networking site. Google indexes one trillion
documents and, a decade after its founding, provides a stunning array
of services ranging from satellite and photographic images of much of
the world to a video library that adds thirty-five hours of content
5
every minute. Children grow up texting and playing networked
games, and businesses depend on email, databases, and other digital
2. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 149–55 (2005) (“Until very
recently, all telecommunications services were joined hip to hip with the particular facilities on
which they were provided. . . . The Internet, however, upsets this established order.”); Barbara
Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
37, 57–58 (1999) (“The Commission initiated a series of proceedings in 1966, known as the
‘Computer Inquiry’ proceedings, which, at the outset, attempted to separate the regulatory
treatment of computers that were involved in the means of communication from the treatment
of computers which perform data processing services.”); Jason Oxman, The FCC and the
Unregulation of the Internet 4–6 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf (“The Internet has
created the information revolution, and it is on its way to becoming the single most important
communications tool in existence.”).
3. See Lance Whitney, Cell Phone Subscriptions to Hit 5 Billion Globally, CNET
(Feb. 16, 2010, 8:28 PM PST), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13970_7-10454065-78.html (citing
International Telecommunications Union estimates that global mobile subscribers will exceed
five billion sometime in 2010); The Internet Big Picture: World Internet Users and Population
Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Apr.
12, 2011) (showing approximately two billion global Internet users).
4. See Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last
visited Apr. 12, 2011) (explaining that Facebook has more than five hundred million active users
and noting that people spend over seven hundred billion minutes per month on the site).
5. See Jesse Alpert & Nissan Haja, We Knew the Web Was Big . . . , THE OFFICIAL
GOOGLE BLOG (July 25, 2008, 10:12 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knewweb-was-big.html (announcing one trillion links in the Google search index); Don Reisinger,
YouTube: 35 Hours of Video Uploaded Every Minute, CNET (Nov. 11, 2010, 8:39 AM PST),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20022481-17.html (noting that YouTube users upload
approximately thirty-five hours of video to the site every minute).
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tools. Burgeoning corporate data repositories and massive data
centers parallel the vast stores of personal data collected by
governments. And with the rise of wireless broadband connections,
mobile devices, and sensors, no moment or place is untouched by the
6
network’s tentacles.
The time has come to reexamine the FCC’s early decisions on
the convergence of computing and communications. Digitization and
consolidation have erased old boundaries. The FCC’s contentious
decade-long effort to articulate regulatory dividing lines for
7
broadband Internet access is moving toward closure. Meanwhile, the
rise of remote network-based applications and storage, or “cloud
computing,” is shifting the balance in the data world from distributed
8
edge systems to centralized networked platforms. Something very
much like the old computer utility vision is coming back into focus.
Technology and industry structure have changed dramatically, but the
basic regulatory issues remain: networked computers need access to
communications utilities, and networked computers can themselves
function as utilities. Through many twists and turns, the FCC’s early
decision to tackle only the first of these concerns has morphed into a
9
posture of skepticism toward both. The FCC must return to and
update its original convergence agenda. As the technical predictions
of 1960s visionaries become real, the policy considerations they raised
must also be taken seriously.
How government and society choose to deal with pervasive
networks will go a long way toward shaping the political economy of
the coming decades. Previously, the relevant public policy debate was
largely focused on network neutrality rules for broadband Internet
10
access providers. “Network neutrality” is the notion that network

6. See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2321 (2007)
(“The world is different today. Technology has dramatically broadened the scope and accuracy
of information about individuals and their actions.”).
7. See Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal
Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE. J.
ON REG. 211, 212 (1999) (discussing the difficulty of classifying the Internet within the
traditional communications infrastructure).
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See generally Oxman, supra note 2 (describing the evolution of the FCC’s policy of
“unregulation” toward Internet services and network platforms).
10. See Rob Frieden, A Primer on Network Neutrality, 43 INTERECONOMICS 4, 14–15
(2008) (“[N]etwork neutrality advocates have identified actual instances where ISPs unilaterally
have blocked traffic, to reduce subscribers’ network demand, handicap a competitor, punish
ventures for not agreeing to pay a surcharge and to stifle criticism about the ISP and its parent
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operators should not be permitted to discriminate unreasonably in
11
their treatment of unaffiliated content, devices, and services. Since
the FCC began in 2002 to classify broadband access as an
“information service” outside of traditional telecommunications
regulation, open Internet advocates have pushed for the imposition of
12
such nondiscrimination requirements. The network neutrality battle
corporation.”); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 142–44 (2003) (introducing the argument that the “preferable framework
for ensuring network neutrality” eschews “structural remedies for a direct scrutiny of
broadband discrimination”). See generally ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40616, ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS: THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE (2010)
(describing the extensive debate over the network neutrality issue).
11. Then-SBC Chief Executive Officer Edward Whitacre captured the essence of the
network neutrality concern when, asked about the future of Internet startups like Google, MSN,
and Vonage, he remarked:
How do you think they’re going to get to customers? Through a broadband pipe.
Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use
my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital
and we have to have a return on it.
At SBC, It’s All About “Scale and Scope,” BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, http://www.businessweek
.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm. For arguments supporting network neutrality, see
generally Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics
of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007); Wu,
supra note 10; and Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality: What a Non-Discrimination Rule
Should Look Like (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 1684677,
2010). For arguments opposing network neutrality, see generally Gerald Faulhaber, Network
Neutrality: The Debate Evolves, 1 INT’L J. OF COMM. 680 (2007); Christopher S. Yoo, Network
Neutrality and Competition Policy: A Complex Relationship, in NET NEUTRALITY OR NET
NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED 25 (Thomas M.
Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006); and Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality,
Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (2008). The FCC has chosen to use the
term “open Internet” when referring to this concept. See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet, 74
Fed. Reg. 62,638, 62,638 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8) (“In this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the Commission considers adopting rules to preserve
the open Internet.” (emphasis added)).
12. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking) (“[W]e conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly
classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no
separate offering of telecommunications service.”); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the
Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 401–02 (2007) (“These network
providers claim that they will have no incentive to improve the penetration of broadband
services in the United States if they are not given the power to control their networks and sell
separately prioritized, guaranteed services. But because the transport layer for Internet access is
not competitive, deregulation of that layer is inappropriate.” (footnote omitted)); Mark A.
Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet
in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 927 (2001) (“How these technologies [DSL and
cable modems] are developed, and the speed with which they are deployed, are critical to the
future design of the internet.”); Wu, supra note 10, at 142 (“The basic principle behind a
network antidiscrimination regime is to give users the right to use non-harmful network
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ratcheted up to a fever pitch in late 2009. It did not cool down even
after the FCC adopted an order on December 21, 2010, setting forth
13
network neutrality rules.
The debate demonstrates that both regulators and deregulators
suffer from a tendency to fight the last war. Network neutrality,
though important, is the final hurrah of the regulatory framework
14
created in the 1996 Telecommunications Act (1996 Act), which was
itself a response to the 1984 divestiture of AT&T. All of these efforts
involve the shift from regulated monopoly to managed competition
15
within defined industry segments. Meanwhile, outside the regulatory
theater, the marketplace has evolved. The telecommunications and
mass media industries the FCC historically regulated are giving way
to digital information platforms in a common environment—the
Internet. The Internet, which began as a messaging and remote access
service, is becoming the repository of massive pools of data
16
processing and storage, a trend known as cloud computing. At the
same time, it is becoming less a means of connecting personal
computers and more a common platform for vast numbers of

attachments or applications, and give innovators the corresponding freedom to supply them.
Such a regime avoids some of the costs of structural regulation . . . .”); Letter from Tim Wu,
Associate Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford
Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 12–15 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://fjallfoss.
fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6514683884 (“The [proposed network neutrality] regime adopts
the basic principle that broadband operators should have full freedom to ‘police what they own’
(the local network) while other restrictions should be viewed with suspicion.”). For a discussion
of the “information service” classification, see infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
13. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 3
(Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order) (“Today the Commission takes an important step to preserve
the Internet as an open platform for innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth,
competition, and free expression.”); Press Release, FCC, FCC Acts to Preserve Internet
Freedom and Openness (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_
Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303745A1.pdf (summarizing the FCC’s actions).
14. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The 1996 Act modified, rather than replaced, the
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). This Article uses “1996 Act” to refer to the newly added
sections and “Communications Act” to describe earlier provisions or the amended statute as a
whole.
15. More specifically, network neutrality is an effort to prohibit unreasonable
discrimination by incumbent network operators against competitive application and content
providers. This approach implies that the application and content markets are the object of the
FCC’s actions, while the network-access markets are its subject, much as the breakup of AT&T
applied regulation to the dominant phone company to facilitate a competitive long-distance
market.
16. See infra Part III.A.
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personal devices and impersonal sensors, as well as a channel for
large volumes of content, especially video. The FCC faces an
enormous challenge in adapting to such an environment.
Fortunately, the FCC can draw upon a substantial, yet largely
forgotten, body of legal, business, and technical literature from the
17
1960s concerning what was then called the “computer utility.” Even
before ARPANet, the project that evolved into the Internet,
technical experts and policymakers widely recognized that computers
and communications would converge into a platform that raised
18
significant public policy questions. The participants in the computer
utility debates were wrong—or perhaps just forty years early—in
their business forecasts. They were right in identifying the regulatory
questions that the FCC, or a successor agency, should address in a
converged digital world. Networked computer systems can function
as utilities, even as they rely on other utilities to reach their
customers. To achieve its public interest mandates, the FCC must
consider the impact of cloud computing and related developments. It
should examine four primary categories of issues for these new
network platforms: connectivity, meaning interconnection policies
and access to communications capacity; robustness, meaning capacity,
security, and reliability; data integrity, namely privacy and control
over user data; and transparency, specifically the disclosure of
network management practices and technical standards. All of these
issues were first raised in the era of the computer utility.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the failings of
the current debates over network neutrality and the FCC’s legal
authority to regulate broadband. Part II traces the history of public
utility regulation and the computer utility debates of the 1960s. Part
III describes the rise of cloud computing and sets out an agenda for
regulation in an era of network utilities.
I. A FUNDAMENTAL DISCONNECT
Although the FCC’s engagement with the Internet has arguably
been a great policy success, the history of that engagement has not
19
been smooth. One problem is that the FCC has labored for fifteen
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005)
(arguing that the FCC’s engagement with the computer and Internet industries has produced
substantial benefits); John Eggerton, Hundt: Internet Is the New Broadcasting and Cable,
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years under a statute that preserves old analog silos, such as
20
telephone service and broadcasting, in a converged digital world.
Simply breaking down those boundaries, however, is no longer
enough. As Internet-based digital connectivity becomes the
foundation for all communications, media, and computer-based
services, the core issues the FCC was created to promote—
competition, innovation, investment, consumer protection, and civic
21
discourse —remain as important as ever. What has changed is the
industry landscape and the associated technological and economic
environment in which those issues develop. The FCC faces many
important issues today, including freeing up more wireless capacity,
promoting the open Internet, and implementing the National
22
Broadband Plan. An inquiry into the role of the FCC tomorrow,
however, must take notice of broader concerns.
The problems with the current regulatory structure can be
examined at three levels. First, the existing legal framework provides
insufficiently robust statutory scaffolding for the tasks the FCC faces.
Second, even if the statutory imprecision could be rectified, the FCC
lacks the capacity for effective regulatory boundary-drawing in the
postmonopoly communications environment. Third, the FCC is set up
to consider the Internet as a specific case or adjunct to its core

BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/450170Hundt_Internet_Is_the_New_Broadcasting_and_Cable.php (quoting former FCC Chairman
Reed Hundt’s claims that FCC actions cleared the way for the broadband Internet as the
nation’s common medium); Oxman, supra note 2, at 7–15 (describing the FCC’s early Internet
policy decisions).
20. See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 37, 39–54 (2002) (“The Internet creates particular tensions with the outdated but
deeply rooted structure of the current regulatory framework.”).
21. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“[T]here is created a commission to be known as the
‘Federal Communications Commission’, which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and
which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter.”); see also Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.) (“An Act [t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”).
22. See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, at ix (2009),
available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf (“This is
America’s plan, written by and for Americans. It’s now time to act and invest in our nation’s
future by bringing the power and promise of broadband to us all.”). Congress directed the FCC
to develop a National Broadband Plan in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001(k)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 515 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 305(k)(1)).
The FCC issued the plan in March 2010 and is now conducting proceedings to implement its
recommendations. FCC, supra, at ix.
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regulatory activities, even though it has become the basic platform for
all of the industries within the FCC’s sphere of action.
A. The Internet Meets Telecom Regulation
1. The Internet Challenge. The Internet is not a particular set of
services or technologies. It is not the same thing as broadband, and it
23
is not the same thing as the Web. The Internet is fundamentally an
agreement to interconnect using an evolving set of technical
protocols, which enable universal delivery of data across the
24
network. What makes the concept of the Internet challenging for
businesspeople and policymakers alike is that it is, in a sense, an
illusion. The Internet is a set of voluntary agreements to follow an
25
evolving set of consensual practices and protocols.
The Internet has changed and developed rapidly over time, and
it will continue to do so. Although critical attributes of the Internet
were evident in 1995—and in some cases in 1985 or 1975—much
changed in the subsequent fifteen years. The Internet in the 1990s was
truly a nascent business and social phenomenon. Most Americans
were not online, and even smaller percentages of citizens in most
26
other countries used the Internet. Electronic commerce and online
advertising were insignificant in comparison to their nondigital

23. The World Wide Web is a particular application and set of protocols for delivering
information from Internet-connected servers to end-user browsers. The Internet encompasses
many such applications, including email, file sharing, and voice communications tools such as
Skype. The Internet is the underlying platform for such applications.
24. In the words of the Federal Networking Council in 1995:
“Internet” refers to the global information system that—(i) is logically linked
together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its
subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent
extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses
or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the
communications and related infrastructure described herein.
Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel
C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts & Stephen Wolff, A Brief History of the Internet,
INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Apr. 12, 2011)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting the Federal Networking Council).
25. See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 347–51 (2008) (“Like the railroad
system or the electric power grid, the Internet is a collection of independent networks that
coordinate their actions, forming what appears to be a seamless collective.”).
26. In 1995, there were twenty-five million Internet users in the United States and forty
million worldwide. See Internet Users, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IT.NET.USER (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (presenting worldwide statistics for Internet use).
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forebears. The primary providers of Internet access were independent
Internet service providers (ISPs), not regulated telecommunications
and cable companies. Laws and regulatory structures developed in
that era are no longer appropriate in this one.
When Congress passed the 1996 Act, there were approximately
one hundred thousand websites in existence; there were well over one
27
hundred million in 2011. In 1998, when Congress passed the Digital
28
29
Millennium Copyright Act and the Internet Tax Freedom Act,
Google had not yet been founded. In fact, virtually none of the top
30
one hundred sites on the Web in 2010 existed at that time. Over 240
million Americans—nearly 80 percent of the population—were
31
Internet users in 2011, according to the World Bank. Millions more
have access to the Internet at work. And with over 285 million U.S.
32
mobile phone subscribers and widespread deployment of Wi-Fi
wireless hotspots, a majority of American adults access the Internet
through wireless connections, according to the Pew Research
33
Center.
Even more significant than how the Internet has grown is how
Internet usage has changed. In 1995, accessing the Internet meant
initiating a dial-up connection through a modem attached to a
personal computer, at speeds that required several seconds to

27. See Web Growth Summary, MIT, http://www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/web-growthsummary.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). For an Internet-growth report contemporaneous to
its birth, see Donna L. Hoffman, Patrali Chatterjee & Thomas P. Novak, Commercial Scenarios
for the Web: Opportunities and Challenges, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., Dec. 1995, http://
jcmc.indiana.edu/vol1/issue3/hoffman.html. For a prediction that Moore’s law applies to web
growth, see K.G. Coffman & A.M. Odlyzko, Internet Growth: Is There a “Moore’s Law” for
Data Traffic?, in AT&T HANDBOOK OF MASSIVE DATA SETS 47, 47–48 (James Abello, Panos
M. Pardalos & Mauricio G.C. Resende eds., 2002).
28. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
29. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-719
(1998) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2006)).
30. See The 1000 Most-Visited Sites on the Web, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
adplanner/static/top1000 (last updated Feb. 2011) (listing the one thousand most-visited sites on
the Web).
31. See Internet Users, supra note 26 (detailing the number of Internet users since 1980).
32. Press Release, CTIA, CTIA—The Wireless Association Announces Semi-Annual
Wireless Industry Survey Results (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.ctia.org/media/press/
body.cfm/prid/1936.
33. See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, MOBILE ACCESS 2010, at 7 (2010), available
at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Mobile_Access_2010.pdf.
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34

download a single image file. By 2010, the vast majority of
Americans had broadband access, an always-on service roughly one
35
hundred times as fast. Software and hardware have evolved to offer
a smoother, richer, more sophisticated Internet experience. Personal
computers and even packaged software applications now offer builtin automatic updating and other communications functions, taking for
granted an Internet connection as an integral part of the computing
experience.
2. The Regulatory Muddle. The telecommunications industry is
subject to extensive regulation by the FCC, an independent federal
36
administrative agency created in 1934. Under the Communications
37
Act of 1934 (Communications Act), the FCC oversees the terms
under which communications companies provide service to their
customers and interconnect with partners or competitors; grants
licenses to use the airwaves for radio, television, mobile phone,
satellite, and other wireless communications; engages in consumerprotection activities involving communications providers; regulates
indecency in broadcast media; authorizes wireless devices; reviews
communications mergers; promotes communications access for
people with disabilities; and oversees competition in the
38
telecommunications and media sector, among other activities. Much
of the Communications Act is sector-specific, including Title II for
telephone service, Title III for broadcasting, and Title VI for cable
39
television. Depending on the classification of a company or service,

34. See RAY HORAK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK
635–36 (2007) (discussing dial-up access).
35. A February 2010 FCC survey found that 78 percent of American adults are Internet
users and 65 percent have home broadband access. John B. Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and
Use in America 3 (FCC Omnibus Broadband Initiative, Working Paper No. 1, 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296442A1.pdf.
36. See generally PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1999) (describing the detailed system of federal
telecommunications regulation in the United States). State public utility commissions also
regulate intrastate communications, and some activities—such as cable television franchising
and access to poles and conduits—are regulated at the municipal level. NUECHTERLEIN &
WEISER, supra note 2, at 47–48, 162.
37. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
38. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 209–12, 220–32, 279–313 (providing an overview of
the authority and jurisdiction of the FCC).
39. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006) (Title II); id. §§ 301–399 (Title III); id. §§ 521–573
(Title VI).
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different obligations may apply. In 1996, Congress passed a major
overhaul that modified the statute to incorporate other distinctions,
such as imposing unbundling and wholesale obligations on incumbent
local-exchange carriers, but not on other providers of
40
telecommunications service.
The 1996 Act was primarily concerned with enabling and
encouraging three distinct segments of the communications
marketplace to cross over into each other’s domains: local exchange
41
carriers, interexchange carriers, and cable television operators.
Congress’s vision was that the entry of new competitors into the local
telephony, long-distance, and multichannel video markets would
promote innovation and lower prices while simultaneously
42
eliminating regulatory restraints. Many competitors entered the
market, only to fail due to changing market conditions, the resistance
of the incumbents, and basic flaws in the 1996 Act’s scheme for
43
network unbundling.

40. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 101, § 251, 110
Stat. 56, 61–66 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)).
41. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 69–74 (discussing the objectives of the
1996 Act); CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING, PHYLLIS W. BERNT & MARTIN B.H. WEISS, SHAPING
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS
258–66 (2006) (describing the culmination of pro-competitive forces in the 1996 Act); Nicholas
Economides, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON.
455, 456–57 (1999) (discussing the goals of the 1996 Act); Charles B. Goldfarb,
Telecommunications Act: Competition, Innovation, and Reform, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND REFORM 1, 8–10 (Charles B. Goldfarb ed., 2006)
(discussing the background of the 1996 Act).
Local exchange carriers provide end users with connections to the public switched
telephone network. Historically, these providers were granted exclusive monopolies for their
territories. Such incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) generally retain significant market
power, even though today competitors may enter their markets, either by leasing portions of the
incumbent network, or by using their own facilities, as in the case of cable telephony or mobile
phone service. Interexchange carriers (IXCs) provide long-distance service between local
exchange carriers. When AT&T was broken up in 1984, it was split into a competitive IXC and
seven regulated ILECs. These “Baby Bells” have since merged down to three (Verizon, AT&T,
and Qwest) and remain the dominant local exchange providers in most of the United States.
After the 1996 Act, they also reintegrated local and interexchange services, a practice that was
prohibited under the AT&T divestiture consent decree. SBC Communications, one of the Baby
Bells, acquired and took on the name of AT&T, and Verizon acquired MCI. Both providers
also offer mobile phone service, an area in which they compete against pure-play mobile
operators such as Sprint and T-Mobile. See generally NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2,
at 55–91 (describing the regulation of wireline carriers before and after the 1996 Act).
42. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 69–70 (“The Act’s foremost aspiration
is greater competition in local telecommunications markets.”).
43. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 315–16 (2005) (“There is
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Over time, though, some intermodal competition has developed.
Cable operators such as Comcast and Time Warner Cable now offer
phone service to millions of customers, in competition with the
44
reconsolidated children of the old AT&T. Verizon and AT&T offer
multichannel video packages in competition with cable, as do direct
45
broadcast satellite providers. And a quarter of U.S. households have
chosen to use a mobile phone as their primary or sole telephone
46
service. The biggest development since 1996, however, has been
convergence. All of these providers now use digital transmission, and
most employ Internet protocol standards to deliver their various
47
services. In other words, the Internet has become the common
platform for all communications industries.
48
The Internet was an afterthought in the 1996 Act. The only time
it is even mentioned expressly is in connection with the
49
Communications Decency Act of 1996
provisions—since
overturned—that imposed restrictions on indecent online speech and
50
created a safe harbor for online service providers. The 1996 Act left
in place the regulatory silos of telephony (Title II), broadcasting
(Title III), and cable television (Title VI), even though converged
widespread agreement today on all sides of the telecommunications wars that something is
deeply flawed with the design or implementation (or both) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.”); Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks with and Without
Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 478 (2005) (criticizing the mandatory unbundling
provisions in the 1996 Act and commenting on the demise of competitive entrants based on
unbundling); Susan Ness, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 531, 532
(2006) (explaining the shortcomings of the 1996 Act); Howard A. Shelanski, Inter-Modal
Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States, 60 COMM. & STRATEGIES 15,
15 (2005) (describing how industry changes following the adoption of the 1996 Act have made it
obsolete).
44. The National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA) reports 23.5 million
cable telephony customers as of September 2010. Operating Metrics, NCTA, http://www.ncta
.com/StatsGroup/OperatingMetric.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
45. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 545 (2009).
46. Maggie Fox, Nearly a Quarter of U.S. Homes Only Use Cellphones, REUTERS, May 12,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64B6F620100512.
47. Michael K. Powell, Comm’r, FCC, The Great Digital Broadband Migration, Remarks
Before the Progress & Freedom Foundation (Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Powell/2000/spmkp003.html.
48. See Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 541 (2010) (“The Internet
is a perfect example [of] when new technologies develop that Congress did not contemplate.”).
49. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43,
invalidated in part by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
50. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 555–61 (discussing the legislative history of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996).
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digital services could have elements of all three. The 1996 Act did
establish a statutory category for information services, defined as “the
offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
51
information via telecommunications . . . .” This definition is broad
enough to encompass Internet-based services. But the 1996 Act was
silent as to what, if any, obligations or FCC actions might attach to
that classification. The fight over FCC jurisdiction to adopt open
52
Internet rules for broadband access stems from this omission.
Approaches based on the information-services classification are
referred to as “Title I” options because that definition and the
general regulatory delegations to the FCC sit within that introductory
title of the Communications Act, as opposed to the service-specific
53
mandates of later titles.
The category of information services paralleled the FCC’s
preexisting category of enhanced services, and the Commission later
54
concluded that the two terms covered the same activities. There is,
however, an important difference between enhanced and information
services. The enhanced services category was originally created in the
55
FCC’s Computer II decisions to cover companies that were separate
from the network operators who provided the underlying basic
56
services of telecommunications transport. An enhanced service
provider (ESP), for example, was considered an end user of the
51. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(2), § 153(41), 110 Stat.
56, 59 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006)).
52. See generally Werbach, supra note 48, at 541–45 (discussing the application of the 1996
Act to the Internet).
53. In Off the Hook, supra note 48, I proposed an ancillary jurisdiction theory rooted in the
interconnection provisions of Title II of the Act, combining the two approaches. Id. at 571–98.
54. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,871 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed
rulemaking) (“[T]he Commission has previously determined that Congress intended the
statutory categories [of information service and telecommunications service] to parallel the
categories [of enhanced service and basic service that] the Commission established in the
Computer Inquiry proceeding.”).
55. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry) (Computer II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision).
56. See id. at 417 (establishing a “separation of common carrier transmission services from
those computer services which depend on common carrier services in the transmission of
information”); Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 185–88 (2003) (discussing the definition of
enhanced services). The basic-enhanced distinction in Computer II revised the division between
communications and data processing in earlier FCC decisions. See infra note 201 and
accompanying text.
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network with access to local business line rates, rather than a carrier
57
subject to usage-based interstate access charges. A network
operator, such as a Bell Operating Company, could provide enhanced
services, subject to competitive safeguards, but in that situation, it
would still be a basic service provider offering enhanced services. The
1996 Act subtly shifted the category by defining information services
58
as those involving computer processing “via telecommunications.”
This opened the door for the move the FCC eventually made in 2002:
classifying broadband access providers that provided both
telecommunications and information service functionality as
59
integrated information service providers. The exception for nascent
users of the network had become the classification for the network
operators themselves.
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
60
Internet Services,
the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s
classification of broadband Internet access as a Title I information
61
service. The Court expressed skepticism that the FCC’s choice was
the proper one, and three Justices dissented on the basis that the
statute compels classification of broadband transmission as a Title II
62
telecommunications service. But the Court upheld the FCC’s actions
on administrative law grounds, invoking Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
63
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. to give deference to an
expert agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
64
congressional delegation. Because it was asked only to decide the

57. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 711–22 (1983) (memorandum
opinion and order) (clarifying the application of the FCC’s rules to entities such as enhanced
service providers).
58. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(2), § 153(41), 110 Stat.
56, 59 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (2006)).
59. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking) (“[W]e conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly
classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no
separate offering of telecommunications service.”); Appropriate Framework for Broadband
Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14,858 (“Consistent with the
Supreme Court’s opinion in NCTA v. Brand X[, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)], we determine that
facilities-based wireline broadband Internet access service is an information service.”).
60. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
61. Id. at 1003.
62. Id. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–86 (applying the Chevron framework to the FCC’s
interpretation of the term “telecommunications service”).
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FCC’s authority to impose the information-services classification, the
Court did not have to consider what, if any, rules the FCC might then
impose on broadband providers.
The FCC in Brand X repeatedly asserted, and the Supreme
Court reaffirmed in dicta, that Title I was more than a regulatory get65
out-of-jail free card. In 2005, the FCC adopted four Internet policy
principles that described user rights vis-à-vis broadband access
66
providers. It coupled these nonbinding principles with the stern
pronouncement that it would incorporate them into its ongoing
67
regulatory activity as appropriate. But the FCC did not explain how
it would do so. Despite loud public and congressional debate about
network neutrality, three more years passed before the FCC actually
tried to impose obligations on a broadband provider for violation of
those principles. When the FCC sanctioned Comcast in 2008 for its
broadband network management practices, Comcast successfully
68
sued it for acting without statutory authority.
3. The Open Internet Proceeding and Beyond. The election of
President Obama triggered a renewed emphasis on network
69
neutrality. Obama endorsed the concept during his campaign, and

65. See id. at 996 (“[T]he Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on
facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”); Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,981 (2005)
(report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (Copps, Comm’r, concurring) (“I also
want to note that the Supreme Court’s Brand X decision makes it clear that the Commission’s
ancillary authority can accommodate our work on homeland security, universal service,
disabilities access, competition, and Internet discrimination protections—and more.”).
66. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,987–88 (2005) (policy statement) (listing four principles “to
ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all
consumers”).
67. Id. at 14,988.
68. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the FCC
had failed to make a showing that it had ancillary authority “to regulate an Internet service
provider’s network management practices”).
69. Barack Obama: Connecting and Empowering All Americans Through Technology and
Innovation, BARACKOBAMA.COM, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/Fact_
Sheet_Innovation_and_Technology.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (supporting “the principle of
network neutrality to preserve the benefits of open competition on the internet” and noting that
“[u]sers must be free to access content, to use applications, and to attach personal devices”).
Upon the enactment of the Open Internet Order, Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd.
17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order), President Obama
expressed his satisfaction with the measure. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press
Sec’y, Statement by the President on Today’s FCC Vote on Net Neutrality (Dec. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/21/statement-president-today-s-
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his choice for FCC chairman, Julius Genachowski, expressed similar
70
support. The FCC began an open Internet proceeding in October
71
2009, proposing enforceable rules for the first time. It bogged down
after the Comcast decision threw the FCC’s legal authority into
question, and broadband providers launched a fierce lobbying
72
assault.
On December 21, 2010, the FCC adopted an order formalizing its
73
open Internet rules (Open Internet Order). The FCC articulated a
new theory of its jurisdiction to regulate broadband Internet access,
based on Section 706 of the 1996 Act, which directed the agency to
promote the deployment of “advanced telecommunications
74
capability.” The Order barred wireline broadband access providers
from blocking or unreasonably discriminating against unaffiliated
services, and it initially imposed lesser restrictions on wireless
75
broadband. The FCC suggested that “paid prioritization”—offering
service providers enhanced delivery for a fee—would likely fail the
unreasonable discrimination test, but it left that question, and most
76
other hard decisions, to case-by-case adjudication. Finally, the Open

fcc-vote-net-neutrality (congratulating the FCC and its chairman for helping “preserve the
freedom and openness” of the Internet).
70. See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A
Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity, Address at the Brookings Institution
(Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-293568A1
.pdf (asserting that “Congress and the President have charged the FCC with developing a
National Broadband Plan to ensure that every American has access to open and robust
broadband” (emphasis added)).
71. See Preserving the Open Internet, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064, 13,065 (2009) (notice of
proposed rulemaking) (offering notice for “public input on draft rules to preserve an open
Internet”).
72. See Editorial, The Price of Broadband Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at A30
(detailing the amount of money that phone and cable companies were spending on political
contributions in opposition to the FCC’s plan to extend its regulatory oversight over access to
broadband Internet); Bennett Roth, FCC Push on Net Neutrality Ramps Up Lobbying, ROLL
CALL (Dec. 1, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-201079-1.html (describing “an
already intense lobbying campaign by telecommunication giants, high-tech firms and open
Internet advocates” that “is sure to become ever more feverish”).
73. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec.
21, 2010) (report and order).
74. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 706, 47 U.S.C. § 1302; Preserving the Open Internet,
52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 36–39 (ruling that Section 706 provides authority for open
Internet rules).
75. Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 22–27, 29–31.
76. See id. at 22–30 (“[W]e will further develop the scope of reasonable network
management on a case-by-case basis, as complaints about broadband providers’ actual practices
arise.”).
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Internet Order adopted a transparency mandate for broadband access
providers, requiring them to disclose their network management
77
practices to customers. The Order was a carefully crafted
compromise. It pleased no one, and it seems likely to face legal
78
challenges, as well as skeptical questioning from Congress.
In a previous article, I argued that the FCC could address the
immediate challenge of supporting open Internet rules through an
ancillary jurisdiction theory based on the interconnection provisions
of the 1996 Act, as opposed to those it chose to support its
79
jurisdiction. Even if the FCC had pursued this option, however, it
would have solved only part of the challenge. The problem the FCC
faces is that its authority comes from a statute that delegates and
specifies regulatory requirements for telephony, cable, wireless
telephony, satellite, and broadcast services. The marketplace it
surveys today is rapidly moving away from those categories toward an
environment featuring only digital broadband connectivity and
services. Since 2002, the FCC has consistently concluded that the 1996
Act places those offerings in the nether realm of information
80
services. In other words, what the statute regulates no longer exists,
and what does exist is barely addressed in the statute.
The near-term drama about the FCC’s classification decision will
play out, but any choice the FCC makes will only be a temporary
solution. Congress must revamp the Communications Act for the
digital broadband era. Such a major legislative change is not to be
undertaken lightly. The 1996 Act was the result of many years of
active deliberation and what was considered the mother of all

77. See id. at 19–22 (“Effective disclosure of broadband providers’ network management
practices and the performance and commercial terms of their services promotes competition—
as well as innovation, investment, end-user choice, and broadband adoption . . . .”).
78. See, e.g., Brian Stelter, F.C.C. Faces Challenges to Net Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9801E6D91739F931A15751C1A9669D8B63
(“Verizon said the F.C.C. order ‘appears to assert broad authority for sweeping new regulation
of broadband wireline and wireless networks and the Internet itself’ without ‘solid statutory
underpinnings.’”); Nate Anderson, Why Everyone Hates New Net Neutrality Rules—Even NN
Supporters, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/
2010/12/why-everyone-hates-new-net-neutrality-ruleseven-nn-supporters.ars (noting that “those
who have always opposed net neutrality weren’t pleased with today’s FCC order instituting it”);
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Most of the Internet Grumbles About FCC Net Neutrality Rules,
WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG, (Dec. 22, 2010, 4:30 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/12/22/
most-of-the-internet-grumbles-about-fcc-net-neutrality-rules.
79. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 571–97.
80. Id. at 576–82.
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81

lobbying battles. The ultimate result bore little resemblance to
earlier drafts after all of the horse-trading and reconciliation had
82
concluded. The FCC and Congress are rightly focused on how to
make the best of the current statutory framework, or perhaps on how
to work a modest tweak to remove uncertainty about the
Commission’s
legal
authority.
Eventually,
though,
such
incrementalism will not suffice. The old statute must give way.
Merely saying so, however, is not enough. The solution to an
outdated legal regime is not the elimination of a legal regime; nor is it
recourse to the goodwill of industry self-regulatory bodies, valuable
as those may be. The task now is to model paradigms and concepts
for what must replace the current framework.
B. Comcast–Level 3: Harbinger of Disputes to Come
For all of the controversy about network neutrality, the scenarios
under consideration in the FCC’s open Internet proceeding may turn
out to be sideshows to the real battle. Network neutrality addresses
the practices of broadband access providers toward their end-user
83
customers. The Open Internet Order expressly limits its mandates to
84
such activities. The access side of the network, however, is only part
of the equation. Broadband access providers also connect to other
85
networks.
The
complex
mesh
of
network-to-network
86
interconnection is the defining characteristic of the Internet. Users’
experiences with broadband, and the experiences of edge innovators

81. See Ray G. Besing, The Intersection of Sherman Act Section 2 and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: What Should Congress Do?, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 3–4 (2005) (describing the legal and lobbying battles that culminated in the
passage of the 1996 Act); Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 219–21 (1996) (positing a theory
of regulatory change based “on the self-interests of the various policymakers and influential
pressure groups”).
82. Senator John McCain called the legislation the “Leave No Lobbyist Behind Act of
1996.” 149 CONG. REC. 21,874 (2003) (statement of Sen. McCain).
83. Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1268 (2008).
84. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1,
17–19 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order) (delineating the scope of the open Internet rules).
85. The networks that carry traffic between local Internet access providers are referred to
as backbones. There is no one Internet backbone, but these high-capacity core networks are
sometimes referred to collectively as “the backbone.”
86. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1250–57 (“At a deep level, the internet is
interconnection. Hence the name, ‘in-ter-net.’”); Werbach, supra note 25, at 367–69 (“[T]he
primary function of the Internet protocol is to enable independent data networks to federate
into a single meta-network.”).
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seeking to deliver new services to those users, depend at least as
much on traffic flows between broadband access providers and other
networks as on traffic flows between those providers and their own
end users or directly connected content providers. The FCC’s Open
Internet Order does not touch these practices.
A dispute between Comcast and Level 3 illustrates the failings of
the existing approach. The controversy involves two major Internet
network operators, Comcast and Level 3 Communications, but its
genesis lies with a company that owns no network facilities: Netflix.
Netflix offers a streaming video service that provides subscribers with
87
immediate access to movies over the Internet. Netflix has been
88
exceptionally successful with this service offering. Estimates are that
Netflix streaming traffic now represents one-fifth of all peak U.S.
89
90
Internet traffic. However, Netflix does not own a network. To
deliver its content to subscribers, it must purchase capacity from
network providers. Several competitors offer transmission services
across the Internet backbone. Until late 2010, Netflix contracted with
content delivery networks (CDNs), primarily Akamai and
91
LimeLight. CDNs distribute content across local caching services
hosted within ISPs’ networks, so that content is delivered to the end
92
user locally rather than across the backbone.
87. Thanks to a variety of business arrangements, this Internet-based service can be
delivered to television sets through set-top boxes such as TiVo or through game consoles such
as the Xbox 360. Press Release, Netflix & Roku, Netflix Teams with Streaming Media
Innovator Roku on Player that Instantly Streams Movies from Netflix Directly to the TV (May
20, 2008), available at http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=272; Instantly Watch
Movies & TV Episodes from Netflix on Your TiVo Box, TIVO, http://www.tivo.com/mytivo/
product-features/on-demand/watch-netflix/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011); Greg Peters,
Wii and PS3 to Be Disc-Free, THE NETFLIX BLOG (Oct. 18, 2010, 8:23 AM), http://blog.netflix
.com/2010/10/wii-and-ps3-to-be-disc-free.html.
88. See Michael Liedtke, Netflix Expects Video Streaming to Drown Out DVDs, BOS.
GLOBE, Nov. 22, 2010, http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2010/11/22/netflix_
expects_video_streaming_to_drown_out_dvds (“[Netflix’s] 17 million subscribers watch more
hours of Internet-streamed video each month than they do on the DVDs they get through the
mail.”).
89. See Peter Burrows, Will Video Kill the Internet, Too?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Dec. 6, 2010, at 43, 43 (“[Netflix] now accounts for 20 percent of all Internet traffic during the
typical American evening . . . .”).
90. See Todd Spangler, The Netflix Niche, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 31, 2011, at 10
(describing how Netflix operates).
91. See Market Talk: Oppenheimer Cuts Limelight, Akamai on Netflix Concerns, DOW
JONES NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 15, 2010, available at Factiva, Doc. DJ00000020101115e6bf0003h.
92. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1254 (“CDNs such as Akamai operate distributed
networks of caching servers, hosted on large numbers of networks, which automatically serve
content to end users from nearby caches.”).
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In early November 2010, Netflix agreed to switch to Level 3, a
93
large wholesale network operator, for its streaming distribution.
Level 3 has not traditionally been a major player in the CDN market.
Instead, it offers transit service across its national backbone for large
94
enterprises and other networks. It also peers with other top-tier
backbones, which means that it engages in settlement-free exchange
of traffic, on the assumption that traffic flows between large networks
95
are relatively equal. The FCC does not regulate commercial
practices in the backbone market, so network operators are generally
free to hash out privately whether a relationship will be considered
96
peering (no money exchanged) or transit.
Among the companies to which Level 3 provides transit service
is Comcast, the largest U.S. residential broadband access provider, as
97
well as the largest cable television provider. Comcast pays Level 3 to
carry traffic from its local networks to other endpoints on the
98
Internet. When Level 3 began carrying Netflix traffic, however, the
traffic flows between it and Comcast suddenly changed. Level 3 was
now delivering roughly five times as much traffic to Comcast as
99
Comcast was delivering to it. Comcast, arguing that it would now be
93. See Cecilia Kang, Level 3 Accuses Comcast of Unfairly Using Its Clout as the Dominant
U.S. Cable Provider, POST TECH (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:20 PM ET), http://voices.washingtonpost
.com/posttech/2010/11/comcast_hit_with_two_net_neutr.html (“Level 3 is the exclusive
backbone Internet service provider for Netflix . . . .”).
94. See id. (“Level 3’s backbone networks deliver content such as videos, retailing Web
sites and games to networks operated by cable and phone companies, which then transmit the
data over the ‘last mile’ of Internet pipes into American homes.”).
95. See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 47–52 (2003) (describing how and why Internet backbones
“cooperate with one another by interconnecting their networks”).
96. See id. at 48 (“[I]nterconnection between Internet backbone providers is not currently
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission . . . or any other government agency.
Instead, the backbones are self-regulated . . . .”).
97. See High-Speed Internet, COMCAST INVESTOR RELATIONS, http://www.cmcsk.com/
high-speed-internet.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (“With nearly 15 million customers,
Comcast is the nation’s largest provider of residential high-speed Internet services.”); Video,
COMCAST INVESTOR RELATIONS, http://www.cmcsk.com/video.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011)
(“With 24.2 million video subscribers, Comcast is the nation’s leading provider of cable
television.”).
98. Press Release, Comcast Corp., Comcast Extends National Fiber Infrastructure (Dec. 7,
2004), available at http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID
=183.
99. See Nate Anderson, Peering Problems: Digging into the Comcast/Level 3 Grudgematch,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 9, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/
comcastlevel3.ars (“Comcast says that, with Level 3’s addition of Netflix in the new year, the
traffic ratios will be as high as 5:1.”); Kang, supra note 93 (recording a Comcast executive stating
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forced to bear the costs of these higher traffic flows, imposed on
Level 3 the recurrent fee it charges to CDNs that deliver traffic
100
destined for its customers. In response, Level 3 put out a press
release attacking Comcast for erecting a “toll booth” on the Internet
and claiming that Comcast’s actions represented a violation of the
101
FCC’s open Internet principles.
The FCC has launched an
102
investigation. It has not, however, given any indication that it will
take action, and there is no precedent for intervention in disputes of
this kind.
The FCC has never chosen to address the Internet backbone
market, in part because it has always deemed competitive forces

that Level 3’s traffic was “highly imbalanced”); Peer Pressure, ECONOMIST BABBAGE BLOG
(Dec. 23, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/12/connecting_
internets (reporting Comcast’s statement that Level 3 “had massively increased the data flow
over the two firms’ connection”); Brian Stelter, Netflix Partner Says Comcast ‘Toll’ Threatens
Online Video Delivery, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010, 6:13 PM), http://
mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/netflix-partner-says-comcast-toll-threatens-onlinevideo-delivery (reporting a Comcast executive’s observation that Level 3 was “sharply
increasing its traffic”). This ratio exceeds the criteria for peering under Comcast’s peering
policy. See Comcast Settlement-Free Interconnection (SFI) Policy, COMCAST, http://www.
comcast.com/peering (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (“Applicant must maintain a traffic scale
between its network and Comcast that enables a general balance of inbound versus outbound
traffic.”). It appears that it also exceeds the terms of Comcast’s transit agreement with Level 3,
given that the agreement was based on the assumption that Level 3 would be providing service
to Comcast. Because all of these agreements are private, however, the terms cannot be publicly
verified.
100. Press Release, Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., Level 3 Communications Issues Statement
Concerning Comcast’s Actions (Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.level3.com/en/AboutUs/Newsroom/Press-Release-Archive/2010/2010-11-29-level3-statement-comcast.aspx; Stelter,
supra note 99. A group of peering experts sent a letter to the FCC disputing Comcast’s claims
that traffic imbalances were still the proper mechanism for determining peering and transit
policies. See Letter from Bradley D. Bopp, Dir. of Eng’g, NationalNet, et al. to Julius
Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, et al. 1–2 (Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://shell.voxel.net/
~arothsch/ratio-petition-v3.pdf (“[T]raffic ratios are an outdated and misleading metric for
determining equality and financial burden . . . .”).
101. See Press Release, Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., supra note 100 (“Level 3 believes Comcast’s
current position violates the spirit and letter of the FCC’s proposed Internet Policy
principles . . . .” (quoting Thomas Stortz, Chief Legal Officer, Level 3 Communications, Inc.)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. See Brian Stelter, F.C.C. Investigates Complaint Against Comcast, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA
DECODER BLOG (Nov. 30, 2010, 3:53 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/fc-c-investigates-complaint-against-comcast (“The chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission said Tuesday that the agency was looking into claims by Level 3 Communications
that Comcast had unfairly erected a toll booth that ‘threatens the open Internet.’”). There has
been to date no formal complaint filed with the FCC, so the Commission is under no obligation
to take any action.
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103

sufficient. The FCC never explicitly concluded that backbones were
outside of its authority. It simply never adopted rules applicable to
that marketplace, which began as an unregulated service provided by
104
small, independent information-services providers. There is a good
legal argument that the backbone should be treated as
telecommunications under the 1996 Act because it involves the pure
105
transport of information. And indeed, interconnection in the
backbone bears a strong resemblance to certain interconnection
issues the FCC regulates in the telephone world, often involving the
106
same companies. The FCC has simply never taken up these
arguments.
The economics involved are complicated. In principle, there is no
reason why one provider or the other should pay the fee. The
distribution chain between Netflix, Level 3, and Comcast is a classic
two-sided market, in which revenues come from both the provider—
107
in this case, Netflix—and end users. Higher fees from Comcast to
Level 3 could increase Netflix’s costs, which Netflix might then have
to recoup by charging more to its customers. On the other hand, if
Comcast is correct that Netflix’s video traffic imposes substantial
costs on its network, Comcast might have to charge slightly higher
rates to all of its users because of the Netflix video influx. As a policy
matter, the FCC might therefore have to weigh its desire for greater
broadband deployment against its desire to promote innovative new
103. See Kende, supra note 95, at 54–55 (describing the economic relationships among
networks comprising the Internet).
104. See id. at 54–56 (“For more than thirty years, the Commission has sought to avoid
imposing unnecessary common carrier regulation on providers of computer services that rely on
the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure for transmission of those services but do not
themselves provide telecommunications services to the public.”).
105. See id. at 55 & n.105 (noting that services that involve pure transport of information are
“basic” services, and that “[t]he Commission has concluded that [‘telecommunications service’]
correspond[s] to the categor[y] of basic”).
106. See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 268–79 (2002) (“[O]ne could imagine the FCC imposing a tariffing requirement
[in the Internet interconnection market], which has been the traditional means of enforcing a
common carrier’s interconnection obligation and is still employed in markets in which the
telecommunications carrier has market power.” (footnote omitted)).
107. See J. Scott Marcus, IP-Based NGNs and Interconnection: The Debate in Europe, 72
COMM. & STRATEGIES 17, 17–19 (2008) (arguing that economic models holding that only the
initiator, and not the caller, received value from a call were even less applicable in the age of
Internet networks); Jean Tirole & Jean-Charles Rochet, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,
37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 (2006) (defining a two-sided market as one “in which one or
several platforms enable interactions between end-users and try to get the two (or multiple)
sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side”).
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broadband applications, which might in turn stimulate broadband
adoption. Many technical complexities are involved in assessing
network costs for Internet traffic, however, including whether
interconnection between networks occurs close to or far from end
108
users.
The Comcast–Level 3 dispute thus highlights the sorts of
questions the FCC would have to ask to develop appropriate policies
for a converged broadband environment. The problem is not that
these questions are challenging, but that they are not even on the
table. Eight years or more of intensive debate about network
neutrality at the FCC have not even touched the proper treatment of
network-to-network relationships in the Internet backbone. Perhaps
the FCC investigation of the dispute will spur a new effort to expand
the scope of the open Internet proceeding, but that seems unlikely.
The FCC has treated regulation of data networking as the exception,
rather than the rule, for so long that it has become almost impossible
for the agency to shift gears.
C. The Fundamental Issue: Computing Meets Communications
109

Boundary-drawing is a difficult challenge for any regulator. If a
category is declared subject to regulation, actors have an incentive to
show that they do not fit that category. This problem grows larger as
the regulatory obligations incident upon the classification grow. Thus,
if a “telecommunications service provider” is subject to a litany of
restrictions, none of which applies to an “information service
provider,” companies have strong incentives to fit themselves into the
108. See Letter from Bradley D. Bopp et al. to Julius Genachowski et al., supra note 100, at
1 (“Traffic ratios were commonly considered by networks seeking interconnection in the late
1990s, where much of the traffic exchanged was subsequently hauled large distances, with
disparities in route-miles traveled and associated costs. In contrast, today, large access and
content networks interconnect at a number of carrier-neutral collocation facilities around the
country, where technical practices are employed to ensure that data is transmitted to an access
network at the location closest to its requesting ‘eyeballs.’”).
109. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, ALBERT L. DANIELSEN & DAVID R. KAMERSCHEN,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 26–66 (1988) (discussing the boundaries between
competition and regulation); ROBERT B. HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM 22–
45 (1989) (discussing the boundaries of several regulatory theories for public utilities such as
telecommunications); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 3–8, 11–12 (1988) (explaining the legal and economic reasons behind regulation);
James W. McKie, Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of Boundaries, 1 BELL J. ECON.
6, 7 (1970) (“[T]he boundary problem [for public utilities] is there. It is becoming more difficult,
and presenting new aspects for solution, as organization and technology develop and
competitive activities press more closely upon the regulated ones.”).
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110

latter bucket. These boundary problems generate both type I and
111
type II errors. Regulators are reluctant to let regulated companies
out of the box, even if some of the restrictions are excessive, and they
are reluctant to put new services inside of the box, even when they
bear the indicia of regulated services.
The 1996 Act gave the FCC this sort of choice between two poor
options. It could either classify all Internet-related services—with the
possible exception of voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)—as
information services, even if offered by carriers, or force a sharp
division between the regulated and unregulated components of
Internet access. The latter option was particularly unsatisfying
because cable operators, which had become the largest providers of
broadband access, had never been subject to common carrier
112
regulation. The FCC would have had either to treat broadband
access by telephone and cable companies differently, creating a
competitive imbalance, or to impose Title II open-access mandates on
cable companies traditionally subject to a different set of rules. The
FCC’s decision was controversial, but it was an imperfect response to
an imperfect statutory framework.
Any system in which obligations depend heavily on service
classification will be problematic when applied to digital systems that
transgress those boundaries. Even when a classification decision
initially produces salutary effects, it will only be a matter of time
before it begins to unravel. The FCC tied its conclusion that
broadband access was an information service to its longstanding
113
policy of “unregulation” toward the Internet.
The FCC has
repeatedly expressed the concern that if it puts some Internet-based

110. See Rob Frieden, The FCC’s Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications
Affect Competition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1275, 1303 (2004) (noting that traditional
telecommunications service providers are being threatened by the proliferation of less-regulated
information service providers).
111. A type I error is a false positive, and a type II error is a false negative.
112. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4843–49 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking); see also John T. Nakahata, Broadband Regulation at the Demise of the 1934 Act:
The Challenge of Muddling Through, 12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 169, 171 (2004) (noting that
cable operators “historically had not been treated as common carriers”).
113. See Oxman, supra note 2, at 18–20 (describing the FCC’s “unregulation” of
broadband).
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services within the purview of traditional telecommunications
114
regulation, it will begin down a slippery slope.
For example, this concern explains the FCC’s actions regarding
VoIP. Even in the 1990s, some VoIP services were, to users, virtually
115
identical to traditional telephony. On the one hand, the obligations
of Title II could not hinge on the technical protocol employed for
outwardly identical services. On the other hand, imposition of
interstate access charges and regulatory obligations for the nascent
VoIP industry would have been disastrous, and imposition of those
obligations on pure computer software providers such as Vocaltec
116
made no sense. The FCC in the 1990s saw no reason to move
forward quickly in tackling this thorny issue: VoIP was a new service
with few customers and was evolving quickly. Unfortunately, some
members of Congress disagreed. They saw unregulated VoIP
threatening subsidies for universal telephone service, because only
telecommunications carriers were required to contribute to the
117
subsidy pool. In 1998, the Senate Appropriations Committee
directed the FCC to explain how it could avoid treating VoIP as a
118
regulated Title II service.
The FCC issued what became known as the Stevens Report,
named for the chairman of the Appropriations Committee who

114. See, e.g., William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, The Road Not Taken: Building a
Broadband Future for America, Remarks Before the National Cable Television Association
(June 15, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek921.html (explaining
his opposition to open access obligations on cable broadband Internet access providers because
they might chill investment).
115. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,550 (1998)
(report to Congress) (“Indeed, from the end-user perspective, these types of phone-to-phone IP
telephony service providers seem virtually identical to traditional circuit-switched carriers.”).
116. See id. at 11,543 (“As a general matter, Title II requirements apply only to the
‘provi[sion]’ or ‘offering’ of telecommunications. Without regard to whether
‘telecommunications’ is taking place in the transmission of computer-to-computer IP telephony,
the Internet service provider does not appear to be ‘provid[ing]’ telecommunications to its
subscribers.” (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(46), 254(d)
(Supp. II 2007))).
117. See 150 CONG. REC. S9069 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen. Alexander)
(“[T]raditional long-distance services are suffering, in part from the increase in telephone calls
made over the Internet with VOIP service.”).
118. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 623, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521–22 (directing the
FCC to review its interpretation of the 1996 Act and to explain its compatibility with the Act’s
plain language).
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119

requested it. The report suggested that “phone to phone” VoIP
120
services could fit well within the Title II definition. But the FCC
stopped just short of the regulatory line, appropriately concerned
about chilling effects on innovation and investment. Once drawn,
however, the tentative distinction gradually became a solid barrier.
The FCC waited years to take on the question of whether some VoIP
services might be classified as regulated telephony, and it has not
121
issued a definitive judgment as of early 2011.
Lines are easier to draw in static industries, in which different
categories of companies are easily distinguished. The effort grows far
more difficult in a fast-changing environment such as the current
telecommunications and data networking sector.
The difficulties the FCC faces can be traced to the distinction
between communications and computing. The FCC’s actions suggest
that the agency sees itself as a regulator of communications and seeks
122
to avoid the possibility that it will regulate computing. It sees the
distinctions in its prior decisions and the 1996 Act as institutionalizing
that division. And it reads the history of the personal computer and
the Internet as evidence that computing-based industries create
wealth and innovation when quarantined from the obligations of
communications regulation. None of these conclusions is incorrect.
The Internet would not have developed if it had been left to the
incumbent communications providers to build it, nor would it have
survived if those operators had been given free rein to stifle its
growth. Framing the issue this way, however, obscures a great deal.
In reality, communications and computing are connected and
becoming more so. The strategy of keeping one in the regulatory box
and the other outside no longer makes sense. Computer-based
services are no longer strangers in the strange land of
communications networks. The important regulatory issues are at the
edges and inside of these networked platforms.

119. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11,519–25
(describing Senator Ted Stevens’s involvement in the report).
120. See id. at 11,543–44 (suggesting that “phone-to-phone” VoIP services “bear the
characteristics of ‘telecommunications services’”).
121. See Werbach, supra note 19, at 44–47 (describing the history of the FCC’s regulation of
VoIP services).
122. See Oxman, supra note 2, at 6 (“The story of the Commission and its role in the
development of the Internet highlights the benefits of the FCC’s early deregulatory efforts to
facilitate the growth of computer applications offered over the public telecommunications
network.” (footnote omitted)).
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II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The FCC’s current trajectory began long before the classification
of broadband access in 2002, the legislative reforms of 1996, or even
123
the Computer II and Computer III decisions that distinguished
regulated “basic” from unregulated “enhanced” services in the 1980s.
In fact, the FCC’s policy approach toward networked-data platforms
began before the Internet existed; it even predated the Internet’s
predecessor, the ARPANet. The current tussle over FCC Internet
regulation is a direct descendant of a set of decisions the FCC made
124
in its Computer I proceeding, which was launched in 1968 in
response to the technological vision of the computer utility. And the
basic questions the FCC confronted then are considerably older still.
They involve the regulatory treatment of companies in a special
position to provide essential services or exercise competitive
bottlenecks—public utilities.
A.

“Affected with a Public Interest”

“Utility” is a term, much like “innovation,” that is widely used
125
but curiously immune to precise definition. Most descriptions of the
concept are circular: a utility is a company, such as a telephone
network, water, or electricity provider, which has special obligations
126
because it functions as a public utility. Yet there is a long history of

123. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry) (Computer III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order).
124. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I Final Decision), 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971)
(final decision and order).
125. I refer here to “utility” in the sense of a regulated provider of certain services. See
Pablo T. Spiller & Mariano Tommasi, The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public
Utilities, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 515, 519 (Claude Menard & Mary
M. Shirley eds., 2005) (defining a utility as a service with large sunk costs, economies of scale,
and massive consumption). In economics, “utility” has a precise meaning: the total satisfaction
derived from consumption of a good or service. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF
MICROECONOMICS 442–43 (5th ed. 2008); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN,
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 15–16 (1946).
126. See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2592 (6th ed. 1993) (“[I]ndustry required by law to
render adequate service in its field at reasonable prices to all who apply for it. Public utilities
frequently operate as monopolies in their market. In the United States, public utilities are most
commonly involved in the business of supplying consumers with water, electricity, telephone,
natural gas, and other necessary services.”); WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 173
(2d ed. 1998) (“A public utility is a business that furnishes an everyday necessity to the public at
large. Public utilities provide water, electricity, natural gas, telephone service, and other
essentials.”); see also Rick Geddes, Public Utilities, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
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legal doctrine and case law on the regulatory treatment of public
utilities, mostly from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
127
centuries. To allow the federal government to impose social and
worker protections, U.S. courts developed a doctrine permitting
regulation of private business activities that were “affected with a
128
public interest.” At the time, the Supreme Court was skeptical of
the regulation of private businesses without an express constitutional
129
mandate. Modern courts have little difficulty finding government
actions supported under either the general police power or the power
to regulate interstate commerce. During the Progressive Era,
however, expansive government desires to regulate the terms and
conditions of powerful corporate interests ran up against limited
130
doctrinal theories of government power.
Certain businesses, such as ferries and ports, had been subject to
limitations on their business practices for centuries; these limitations
typically required them to provide service to all comers on a
131
nondiscriminatory basis. Progressives built on this foundation to
justify reforms that restricted businesses’ dealings with their
customers, employees, and competitors. The first legal challenge was
to fit this “common carriage” concept into a doctrinal rubric. The

ECONOMICS 1162 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (“[Public utility]
industries share a common ‘network’ structure, in that they have an extensive distribution
system of lines, pipes, or routes requiring the use of public rights of way, often with strong
physical linkages between component parts.”).
127. The concept was well-entrenched in American jurisprudence in the early twentieth
century. See Gustavus H. Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law, 41 HARV. L.
REV. 277, 277 (1928) (“Since not long after the Civil War we have accustomed ourselves to
‘private business’ as one large category, and ‘public business’ as another.”).
128. Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1100–01
(1930). See generally BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPORATIONS AND ALL OTHERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (1911) (discussing the
“affected with a public interest” doctrine); Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases,
Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1953) (same); Breck P. McAllister, Lord
Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930) (same).
129. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3, 24 (1991) (explaining that, during the Lochner era, the Court
generally believed that the “concepts used to resolve constitutional disputes must be contained
in the Constitution, or must so clearly effectuate goals contained in the Constitution that for all
intents and purposes they may be conceived of as being contained in the Constitution”).
130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880 (1987) (“In the
Lochner era itself, of course, the police power could not be used to help those unable to protect
themselves in the marketplace.”).
131. See Hamilton, supra note 128, at 1093–94 (discussing Lord Hale’s argument that
wharves necessary to the public could not charge excessive rates for use).
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second was to expand common carriage to cover the newly emerging
business powers of an industrializing nation.
132
133
The leading case, Munn v. Illinois, was decided in 1876. The
Supreme Court held that the state of Illinois could set rates and other
134
terms for grain elevators on the shores of Lake Michigan. The
Court concluded that the grain elevators, although not traditional
135
common carriers, were nonetheless “affected with a public interest.”
As such, they were subject to greater regulatory oversight than
private businesses. The Court in Munn traced this doctrine to an
136
eighteenth-century treatise by English jurist Matthew Hale.
In the years following Munn, the courts struggled to define the
137
boundaries of “affectation with the public interest.” The doctrine
was criticized for being nothing more than a catch-all category for
138
things that the courts wanted to regulate. Even those who defended
it acknowledged that the term was essentially a marker for allowing
legislatures to act in appropriate ways to enforce public policy
139
objectives.
140
Finally in 1934, in Nebbia v. New York, the Supreme Court
gave up the game: “The phrase ‘affected with a public interest’ can, in
the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for
141
adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good.” The
Court, under its more expansive New Deal vision of the Constitution,
was willing to permit public regulation of private businesses without
the legal fiction of some distinct industrial category. Although the
constitutional basis for development of the “affectation with the
public interest” test disappeared in the first half of the twentieth
century, the concept endures. At a general level, the endurance of the

132. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
133. Id. at 113.
134. Id. at 130–31.
135. Id. at 127.
136. Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 72, 79 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787).
137. See Hamilton, supra note 128, at 1096–1106 (describing post-Munn cases in which
courts came to varying conclusions about what “affectation with the public interest” meant).
138. See Robinson, supra note 127, at 280–81 (arguing that extensions of the doctrine to
grain elevators, stockyards, and a cold storage business were accomplished “by the method of
real or fictional analogy”).
139. See Hamilton, supra note 128, at 1106–07 (“The question is to be approached as an
aspect of the public policy for the control of an industry.”).
140. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
141. Id. at 536.
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concept, despite its analytical flaws, demonstrates that even in the
limited governmental area, some regulation of private market actors
142
is necessary to avoid market failures.
More specifically, the public-interest concept made the jump
from common law doctrine to legislative command for the
administrative agency overseeing the telecommunications sector. The
143
Radio Act of 1927, the precursor to the 1934 Communications Act,
which established the modern FCC, introduced the requirement that
wireless licensees serve the “public interest, convenience, or
144
necessity.”
This phrase was incorporated into both the
Communications Act and the 1996 Act as a central policy mandate.
Regulated common carriers such as AT&T were given extraordinary
protection by the government against competition, and, in return,
they bore special obligations as public utilities. Only a regulated
carrier, for example, could provide “message switching,” or services
analogous to telephone service, but it had to do so at rates and terms
145
approved by both the FCC and state regulatory commissions.
Since the 1970s, there has been a dramatic shift away from
intrusive public utility regulation and toward the facilitation of
146
competition.
Some remnants of public utility regulation—like
exclusive franchises, rate regulation, tariffing, and other
mechanisms—remain in energy and transportation, but they have

142. See Paul Kens, Property, Liberty, and the Rights of the Community: Lessons from
Munn v. Illinois 7 (May 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1612824 (“The pervasiveness of regulations of business practices [in the nineteenth century]
undoubtedly reflects an understanding among the era’s people, policy makers, and judges that,
while the right to own private property was inviolable, the uses to which it might be put was
subject to regulation.”).
143. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
144. Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for
the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 (1998) (discussing the legislative history of the
“public interest” standard in the 1927 Radio Act); see also Kevin Werbach, Supercommons:
Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 870–71 (2004)
(discussing the history of the Radio Act of 1927).
145. These limitations were relaxed over the years and were substantially transformed by
the 1996 Act. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 69–74 (describing the goals of the
1996 Act with regard to wireline carriers).
146. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (describing the dramatic changes in
the United States’ approach to regulating communications in the last quarter of the twentieth
century).
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The 1996 Act
largely disappeared from telecommunications.
represented a decisive break from the model of regulated
148
monopoly. The FCC’s role is now to promote competition through
access regulation and other means, not to substitute for it.
The concept of the public utility remains relevant, even as the
regulatory approaches historically associated with it have disappeared
from the communications sector. As many commentators have
recognized, and as courts eventually acknowledged, the doctrine was
never really about a well-defined class of monopoly service
149
providers. Public utility regulation was always a means to serve
public policy ends for network platforms and other businesses with
bottleneck control. Even in the current deregulatory era, the
possibility of market failure supports both antitrust and sectoral
regulation. Take away the historical association between public utility
regulation in telecommunications and exclusive monopoly franchises,
and what endures is the recognition that some private firms can raise
public concerns. As Professors Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale have
pointed out, regulatory mechanisms to promote fairness and
accessibility have been applied to many private entities that wield
150
significant exclusionary power. The first question to ask, therefore,
is whether particular services and service providers raise the same
concerns that have motivated public utility regulation. In the 1960s,
many experts in the new field of computer science were convinced
such concerns were on the horizon. Unsurprisingly, they described
the emerging systems with the term “computer utility.”

147. For a discussion on some of the traditional regulatory approaches that were eschewed
by the 1996 Act, see Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New
Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 63–69 (2007).
148. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (“An Act to promote competition and reduce
regulation . . . .”).
149. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
150. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1175–76 (2008) (“When a
private party occupies an extraordinary position of power that makes it indispensable to others
for obtaining certain important resources, goods, or services, and when alternatives are very
limited, traditionally there has been more receptiveness to the application of fairness and
accountability norms.”); see also Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The
Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 112 (2010)
(developing further the arguments for Internet intermediaries more generally).
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B. The Computer Utility Vision
The convergence of communications and computing is not a new
phenomenon. In fact, it was an anomaly that most computers during
the period roughly between 1980 and 2000 were individual PCs that
did not interconnect with one another remotely. Systems that used
circuits from telecommunications operators to deliver computing
services at a distance were developed not long after the first digital
151
computers were created. By the 1960s, it was estimated that more
than half of all computers would be tied into communications
152
networks within a decade. The interdependence of computers and
communications was a hot topic of debate in the late 1960s, before
153
the Internet even existed. And major network operators at that time
were cognizant that computers would increasingly become the
technical foundation for the telecommunications system itself. The
debate at the FCC about how to keep computers out of the regulatory
quagmire actually began as a discussion about how to bring them in.
The term for the original vision of computing fused with
communications was the computer utility.
The phrase “the computer utility,” though it has faded from use,
was widely employed among computer scientists and related thinkers
154
in the 1960s. These researchers had a strong belief that centralized
151. See infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
152. Bernard Strassburg, The Computer Utility—Some Regulatory Implications, 9
JURIMETRICS J. 19, 20 (1968) (“It is predicted . . . that by 1970 some 60 percent of all computers
will be tied into the nation’s communications network . . . .”).
153. See, e.g., Manley R. Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE
L.J. 1299, 1299 (1967) (“Within the decade, electronic data centers will provide computational
power to the general public in a way somewhat analogous to today’s distribution of electricity.
Computer systems will blanket the United States, establishing an informational grid to permit
the mass storage, processing, and consumption of a variety of data services . . . .”); Delbert
Smith, The Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities: A
Question of Federal Regulation, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 829 (1968) (“Numerous and
sophisticated interconnections between computer and communication services and facilities
have raised problems of regulatory policy that are aggravated by the anomaly of partial
regulation: communications carriers are regulated under the Communications Act of 1934, but
computer services remain thus far unregulated.” (footnote omitted)).
154. See, e.g., C.C. BARNETT, JR., B.R. ANDERSON, W.N. BANCROFT, R.T. BRADY, D.L.
HANSEN, H. SIMMONS, D.C. SNYDER, D. WECHSLER & J.L. WILCOX, THE FUTURE OF THE
COMPUTER UTILITY (1967); D.F. PARKHILL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY
(1966); Greenberger, supra note 1; Elizabeth Fowler, Computer Utility Set, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1965, at 45; J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communication Device,
SCI. & TECH., Apr. 1968, reprinted in SYS. RESEARCH CTR., RESEARCH REPORT 61, IN
MEMORIAM: J.C.R. LICKLIDER 1915–1990, at 21 (1990), available at http://www.hpl.hp.com/
techreports/Compaq-DEC/SRC-RR-61.pdf; Paul Baran, Communication Policy Issues for the
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networked computing systems represented a major new class of
155
public utility alongside electricity and telephone systems. And those
who articulated this vision understood that it meant the convergence
of computing and regulated communications. For example, the
introduction to the proceedings from a major series of academic
symposia on the topic, published in 1968, concluded confidently that
“the data processing industry and the communications common
carriers have been led inexorably toward the concept of the computer
156
utility.”
The technical foundations of the computer utility were timesharing systems that allowed many users to access the same
157
mainframe computer through remote communications links.
Modern electronic computers were first developed around the time of
World War II, originally for military and scientific applications. In the
post-war years, vendors such as IBM, Honeywell, NCR, and
158
Burroughs began to sell mainframe computers to large businesses.
These devices were so large and expensive that only the biggest
corporations, academic institutions, and government agencies could

Coming Computer Utility (RAND Paper Series, Paper No. P-3685, 1968); Chris McDonald, The
Computer Democracy: The Politics of the Computer-Communications Infrastructure from the
Computer Utility to the Internet (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
155. See, e.g., Baran, supra note 154, at 2 (“There is a growing belief that we may be moving
into an era where information processing is bought just like electricity—a computer utility.”).
156. Fred Gruenberger, Preface to COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS—TOWARD A
COMPUTER UTILITY, at vii, vii (Fred Gruenberger ed., 1967).
157. Time sharing grew out of advances pioneered by the Air Force’s SAGE anti-aircraft
targeting computer, which was designed at MIT. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 55–58 (“Of
greatest importance . . . is the fact that the SAGE computing system is an on-line real-time timeshared system that is simultaneously employed by many different users.”); McDonald, supra
note 154, at 1 (“In the first half of the 1960’s, researchers at MIT and elsewhere extended the
work done on SAGE to create a new technique known as time-sharing.”).
158. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO
GOOGLE 49 (2008) (“Soon after the first UNIVAC appeared, IBM introduced its own line of
mainframe computers, the 701 series, and by 1960 Honeywell, General Electric, RCA, NCR,
Burrough, and AT&T’s Western Electric division were all in competition to sell computer
gear.”); Greenberger, supra note 1, at 63 (“[I]n 1954, a UNIVAC was delivered to the General
Electric Company in Louisville for business use. . . . [In 1964] there [were] probably more than
twenty thousand computers in use within the United States, and correspondingly large numbers
[were] installed in many other countries around the world.”).
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159

afford them. Access was limited to a small cadre of scientists and
160
staff associated with those institutions.
Time-sharing technology parceled out the mainframe’s
processing capacity into extremely short time slices. Several users
could therefore program and receive output from the same machine
at the same time. Each user had the impression of continuous access
161
to the machine. In an era before personal computers, time sharing
was a revolutionary technique. It allowed anyone with the requisite
skills access to computational capacity, instead of just those within
162
major corporations and government or academic research centers.
The development of remote terminals expanded the power of time
sharing still further. With these terminals, a programmer could
interact with a computer from a remote location by using a telephone
network link. Decades before it was feasible to build a small
computer affordable enough for an individual user, remote time
sharing created the experience of individual, local interaction with
computer processing.
A major locus of computer utility development was Project
163
MAC, an early time-sharing system developed at MIT. Professor
Robert Fano, the head of Project MAC, drew an analogy between
remote networked computing and traditional utilities such as
electricity, in that both offered on-demand access to greater capacity

159. See CARR, supra note 158, at 52 (“Because it was so expensive to buy or lease
mainframes—the rent on a typical IBM computer was about $30,000 a month in the mid1960’s—a company had to keep the machine in constant use if it was to justify the expense.”).
160. For further discussion of the early history of computers, see Harry D. Huskey,
Computers—Academy to Industry, in COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 156, at
53, 53–58.
161. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 51 (noting that the computer utility includes features
such as “[e]ssentially simultaneous use of the system by many remotely located users” and
“[a]vailability of at least the same range of facilities and capabilities at the remote stations as the
user would expect if he were the sole operator”).
162. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 3 (“A decade before computer hobbyists on the West
Coast created the personal computer, the computer utility vision of how computing could be
brought to the masses captured the imagination of researchers, computer businesses, and the
popular press.”).
163. See R.M. Fano, The MAC System: The Computer Utility Approach, IEEE SPECTRUM,
Jan. 1965, at 56, 56 (describing the MAC project and pointing out that MAC stood for, among
other things, “multiple-access computer”); McDonald, supra note 154, at 1 (“In the first half of
the 1960’s, researchers at MIT and elsewhere extended the work done on SAGE to create a new
technique known as time-sharing.”).
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than any individual user could maintain. As Fano astutely noted,
the computer utility offered three additional benefits, compared to a
relatively nondifferentiated input such as electricity: “a great variety
of services,” the ability for a user to “store and retrieve his own
private files of data and programs,” and a “convenient means for
165
collaboration.” The research conducted through Project MAC in
the early 1960s, along with other academic time-sharing projects,
created broad awareness in the academic community about the
166
potential of such systems.
Time sharing also created new business opportunities.
Companies such as Computer Sciences Corporation, University
Computing Corporation, and General Electric established computing
service bureaus, which offered customers access to time-shared
167
computing capacity. These service bureaus became a hot growth
168
market in the late 1960s. Western Union, still a major regulated
common carrier even though its telegraph service had been eclipsed
by the telephone, announced plans for a major push into the
169
computer utility business. The commercial time-sharing market was

164. See Fano, supra note 163, at 56 (discussing “the notion of a community utility capable
of supplying computer power to each ‘customer’” that was “analogous to an electrical
distribution system”).
165. Id. at 56–57. These elements—on-demand capacity, service delivery, partitioned access
to private data or applications, and collaboration capabilities—are at the heart of today’s cloud
computing platforms. See infra Part III.B.1.
166. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 5 (“Despite their very limited capabilities . . . early
time-sharing systems made conceivable to Fano, Kennedy, and others, especially within the
academic community, something like a public utility for computer power.”).
167. See HOMER R. OLDFIELD, KING OF THE SEVEN DWARFS: GENERAL ELECTRIC’S
AMBIGUOUS CHALLENGE TO THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, at v–vi (1996) (describing the
creation of the GE Computer Department and noting that “the Computer Department
pioneered in the development of time-sharing and multi-processing techniques”); McDonald,
supra note 154, at 5 (“Numerous computer businesses latched onto the idea that time-sharing
and the information utility were the wave of the future.”). Interestingly, IBM, the dominant
company in the computer industry, was barred from serving as a service bureau under the terms
of a 1956 consent decree. United States v. IBM Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,245, at
71,125 (S.D.N.Y.). IBM nonetheless developed an offering under which a user would bring data
to an IBM data center, process it, and pay IBM for the computer time, rather than the
processing service per se. Smith, supra note 153, at 834. This model bears striking similarities to
the public cloud computing model now embraced by Amazon.com and others. See infra Part
III.B.1.
168. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 5 (noting that businesses invested in time-sharing
machines in part to “take advantage of red-hot capital markets for high-tech companies”).
169. See id. (“Most ambitious of all was Western Union. Driven to reinvent itself as
something more than a telegraph company . . . it announced plans in 1965 to become a national
information utility.” (citation omitted)).
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estimated at $70 million in 1968, but analysts at the time estimated
170
that it would grow to over $1 billion in 1973.
The computer utility systems of the 1960s supported only a few
dozen or hundred users simultaneously and offered text-only
functionality that a modern PC user would find archaic. Despite these
limitations, advocates envisioned them as the starting point for
something far grander: national-scale public computer utilities that
would transform business, shopping, entertainment, public services,
171
and more. Descriptions of the computer utility from the midtwentieth century are eerily prescient. For example, the definition in a
leading book on the concept, published in 1966 by Mitre Corporation
researcher Douglas Parkhill, sounds exactly like the modern Internet:
“As generally envisaged, a computer public utility would be a
general-purpose public system, simultaneously making available to a
multitude of diverse geographically distributed users a wide range of
different information-processing services and capabilities on an on172
line basis.”
Parkhill described the computer utility as offering simultaneous
access to many remote users; concurrent operation of multiple
applications; availability of the same features remotely as a local
computer would offer; a fee structure for access; flexibility to add
capabilities while the system was still operating; and “a capacity for
indefinite growth, so that as the customer load increases, the system
173
can be expanded without limit by various means.” Parkhill and
others also recognized that some computer utilities would be publicly
available and some privately operated for internal corporate or
174
government use.
170. Manley R. Irwin, Computers and Communications: The Economics of Interdependence,
34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 360, 361 (1969); see also Whole New Market, FORBES, July 1, 1969,
at 43, 43 (predicting that, “[b]y some estimates, AT&T revenues will reach $35.5 billion in 1980,
with at least half generated by data communications”). These rosy predictions proved
unfounded. In hindsight, the computer utility bubble could be compared to the Internet bubble
that inflated and then popped thirty years later.
171. See JOHN G. KEMENY, MAN AND THE COMPUTER 21 (1972) (arguing that “[i]t is only
through [time-sharing] that a true symbiotic relationship between man and computer is
possible”); PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 154–66 (arguing that a computer utility would lead to a
new monetary system, computerized shopping, shared information services, interactive
processing, automatic publishing, and improved economic planning and control).
172. PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 3. The epigraph for this Article, published in 1964, is
another example. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
173. PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 51–52.
174. See id. at 52 (“In addition to the general-purpose public form, there are countless other
possible shapes that a computer utility might take. These include private general-purpose
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The computer utility vision also drew on a then-influential
175
concept from computer science called Grosch’s law. Grosch’s law
held that the performance of a computer system increases at the rate
176
of the square of its cost. In other words, computer deployments
have significant economies of scale, because the price-performance
ratio of a computer increases as the computer grows. A larger
computing installation would have an inherent performance or
pricing advantage over a smaller one. All things being equal,
therefore, the market would tend toward large centralized computing
177
systems.
This vision mirrored the natural-monopoly rationale for
178
communications regulation that also held sway at the time.
According to this theory, telecommunications networks had strong
economies of scale due to their high fixed costs and the scale
179
efficiencies of large providers such as AT&T. AT&T could provide
phone calls at a lower marginal cost than smaller independent
systems, private special-purpose systems such as those used for airline-reservation purposes,
public special-purpose systems, public and private multiple-purpose systems, and a whole
hierarchy of increasingly complex general-purpose public systems . . . .”).
175. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1089 (“In computing at that time, bigger was
better.”); George Gilder, The Information Factories, WIRED, Oct. 2006, at 178, 202 (“Google’s
magical ability to distribute a search query among untold numbers of processors and integrate
the results for delivery to a specific user demands the utmost central control. This triumph of
centralization is a strange, belated vindication of Grosch’s law, the claim in 1953 that computer
power rises by the square of the price.”).
176. JULIA LOBUR & LINDA NULL, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND
ARCHITECTURE 589 (2006). By the end of the twentieth century, computer scientists considered
Grosch’s law to be disproven. PAUL A. STRASSMANN, THE SQUANDERED COMPUTER 31–32
(1997).
177. See STRASSMAN, supra note 176, at 31 (“[T]he profitability of computerization would
show up when firms bought large-scale equipment and centralized the workload in data centers
for more efficient processing.”).
178. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 12 (describing a natural monopoly as a
market in which, because prices to the consumer are lowest when one firm is providing the
service, “scale economies keep increasing until a provider is serving all customers in the
market”); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 337–60 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining the economics behind natural
monopolies and proposed solutions).
179. A more modern argument with a similar thrust focuses on network effects. See
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 2, at 4–10 (arguing that certain industries, such as
telecommunications, tend toward monopoly because “the value of the network to each user
increases or decreases, respectively, with every addition or subtraction of other users to the
network”); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 173–75 (1998) (“Whether real or virtual, networks have a
fundamental economic characteristic: the value of connecting to a network depends on the
number of other people already connected to it.”).
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operators, so it would eventually win out. Competition was seen as an
impediment to efficient functioning of the market. One large
integrated provider such as AT&T was superior to many smaller
competitors, so it made sense for the regulatory system to enshrine
the monopoly control of that dominant provider. These assumptions
animated the regulatory debates that followed.
C. Convergence Regulation: The Prequel
During the heyday of the computer utility, researchers and
policymakers engaged in significant discussion about the legal and
180
regulatory implications of this new phenomenon. Because remote
time sharing required interconnection with communications circuits,
it impinged on the domain of the FCC. The communications
regulatory world of the 1960s, however, was very different than that
of the early twenty-first century. An emphasis on opening up
competitive opportunities and facilitating market-based solutions has
largely replaced the direct price regulation of monopoly service
181
providers. Instead of a few vertically integrated but horizontally
siloed providers such as AT&T and ABC, the FCC now oversees a
fragmented and overlapping communications marketplace. These
differences, along with the computer utility as the model for
networked data services, explain the FCC’s subsequent path of
quarantining data services from regulated communications. Ironically,
the most prominent dispute of the 1960s never produced an FCC
decision, although it laid the groundwork for what came later.
1. Bunker Ramo. The Bunker Ramo Corporation was an early
computer services firm. Among other things, it developed some of the
182
first electronic reservation systems for major airlines. It also offered
electronic quotations services for the brokerage industry. These
services allowed stock brokers to obtain up-to-date stock prices
through remote data terminals in their offices. In 1964, Bunker Ramo
developed a new service, Telequote IV, that added two-way

180. See, e.g., PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 145–52 (discussing some of the legal issues
unique to computer public utilities).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 146–48.
182. See William Shelton Mackenzie, The Legal and Competitive Aspects of the “Computer
Utility” 51 (1968) (unpublished MBA project, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)
(on file at Lippincott Library, University of Pennsylvania) (“[Bunker Ramo] is a pioneer in
airline reservation systems, designing installations for Braniff, United, Trans-World, and
American Airlines.”).

WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

4/14/2011 6:24:49 PM

1800

[Vol. 60:1761

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
183

communications capabilities to its brokerage product. Now brokers
could not only receive quotes, but could also place trades or
communicate with other brokers directly through the system. The one
problem with Bunker Ramo’s service was that to reach its customers’
remote terminals, the service needed communications circuits to
connect its data center to the telephone network.
AT&T and Western Union both refused to provide the
184
requested lines. They argued that Bunker Ramo was improperly
engaging in a regulated common carrier service because Telequote IV
185
allowed brokers to communicate with each other. Resale of
communications services was, at the time, prohibited; carriers had a
protected monopoly enforced by the FCC. Bunker Ramo argued that
its offering was primarily a data processing service and that the
capacity for direct communication between brokers was merely
186
incidental. The carriers rejected this claim and refused to provide
187
the necessary lines. Western Union then introduced a service
offering of its own, called SICOM, that was “virtually
188
indistinguishable from Telequote IV.”
Bunker Ramo took its case to the FCC. It argued that AT&T
and Western Union were improperly refusing to provide service
because it was primarily an unregulated data processing provider, not
189
a provider of regulated communications service. It also argued that
Western Union was engaged in discrimination by providing the
circuits to its own SICOM service and not to Bunker Ramo’s
190
competitive offering. After a series of counteraccusations, AT&T
183. See id. (“In 1964–1965, the company initiated what it called Telequote IV, a stock
quotation system for brokers, which included the capability for communication not only
between a remote terminal and a centralized computer, but also between various customers
subscribing to the Telequote IV service.”).
184. Id. at 51–52.
185. Id. at 53.
186. See id. at 52 (“Bunker-Ramo claimed that communications was ‘incidental’ to the
overall Telequote IV service, and that broker-to-broker communications accounted for
approximately 2% of the communication utilization.”).
187. Id. at 51–52.
188. Id. at 54.
189. See GERALD W. BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 172–73 (2003)
(explaining that Bunker Ramo “was treated as an unregulated data processing service” and that
the company sought to add a service that allowed buying and selling of stock prices, as opposed
to simple stock quotations, but was denied by AT&T because AT&T believed Bunker Ramo to
be a service communications company).
190. Mackenzie, supra note 182, at 56–58 (explaining that, although Western Union argued
that “the lines it leases to customers and the lines that it uses for the SICOM offering are not
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and Bunker Ramo negotiated a resolution of their dispute, and
Bunker Ramo ultimately withdrew Telequote IV before the FCC had
191
an opportunity to rule on it.
The Bunker Ramo controversy highlighted the concern that
networked data processing services depended on access to
communications infrastructure. The computer utility was a hybrid of
communications and computing, but communications in the 1960s
was a regulated monopoly. If the network operator failed to provide
communications capacity, or did so at excessive prices or with poor
service quality, the associated computing service could not succeed.
These issues have only become more salient in the intervening
years. Concerns that network operators will block or degrade
potentially competing services lie at the heart of network neutrality.
192
The Comcast–Level 3 dispute reflects the same dynamics. Level 3
argued that Comcast was imposing charges for carriage of Netflix
traffic at least in part because Netflix represented a threat to
193
Comcast’s video business. Level 3 saw itself as a user of Comcast’s
connections to provide information services to its customer, Netflix.
Comcast, in essence, saw Level 3 as a carrier seeking to avoid proper
carrier treatment.
The Bunker Ramo incident, now forgotten, anticipated the
network neutrality fight by forty years. It was also a significant
impetus for the FCC’s examination of the regulatory issues that the
194
new computer utilities posed. Partly in response to the controversy,
the Commission began its long effort to define the boundaries
between communications and computing.

the same,” Bunker Ramo argued that “users of SICOM are being allowed to effectively share
private lines provided by the carrier at greatly reduced rates”).
191. Hanan Samet, Computers and Communications: The FCC Dilemma in Determining
What to Regulate, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 71, 75 n.19 (1978).
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
194. See Samet, supra note 191, at 75 (“The first computer inquiry was prompted, in part, by
a dispute between the Bunker-Ramo Corporation and Western Union.”); Note, The FCC
Computer Inquiry: Interfaces of Competitive and Regulated Markets, 71 MICH. L. REV. 172, 192
(1972) (describing the “ruinously slow” legal process in the Bunker Ramo case); Barry Taub,
Comment, Federal Communications Commission Regulation of Domestic Computer
Communications: A Competitive Reformation, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 947, 961 (1973) (explaining the
dispute and the FCC’s response).
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2. Computer I. In 1966, the FCC launched what became known
195
as Computer I, the first of three major cycles over three decades
196
referred to collectively as the Computer Inquiries. The Computer I
Notice of Inquiry did not explicitly reference the Bunker Ramo
controversy or the computer utility discussions among computer
scientists, but it reflected the prevailing wisdom that the futures of
communications and computing were intertwined. The FCC
highlighted computerized stock quotation offerings as an example at
the outset of the Notice of Inquiry, most likely an allusion to the
197
Bunker Ramo incident.
For the time, Computer I was an intensely contested proceeding.
Over sixty organizations filed comments, totaling over three thousand
198
pages. The FCC found the submissions so substantial that it hired
the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to review them and formulate
199
recommendations. FCC Common Carrier Bureau Chief Bernard
Strassburg commented a few months after the proceeding was
launched that “[t]he Inquiry has been characterized by many as the
200
most important one the Commission has ever embarked upon.” It
took the FCC five years from the Notice of Inquiry that began the
proceeding to publish the Final Decision that adopted binding rules.

195. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I NOI), 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) (notice of
inquiry); Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I Tentative Decision), 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970)
(tentative decision); Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971).
196. See generally Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services, 10 FCC Rcd. 8360 (1995) (notice of proposed rulemaking)
(recounting the history of the Computer Inquiries).
197. See Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d at 13 (“The communications common carriers are
rapidly becoming equipped to enter into the data processing field.”).
198. Donald A. Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communications Services, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 369 (1969).
199. See D.A. DUNN, STANFORD RESEARCH INST., REPORT NO. 7379B-1, POLICY ISSUES
PRESENTED BY THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
(1969) (summarizing and analyzing the responses to the FCC Computer Inquiry). The SRI
report synthesized the comments and organized the issues in the proceeding, but it offered only
limited guidance to the Commission in resolving the thorny issues. Id. at 54 (“[The data] is not
complete enough to be of guidance in making specific and far reaching policy decisions.”).
200. Strassburg, supra note 152, at 19. Two decades later, the FCC reaffirmed this
assessment. See Computer III, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 966–67 (1986) (report and order) (“The
regulatory issues spawned by the technical confluence of regulated communications services and
unregulated [computer networks] have been among the most important matters this
Commission has dealt with over the past 20 years.”).
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The Computer I Final Decision distinguished “communications”
201
The dominant regulatory
from “data processing” functions.
202
question regarding the computer utility was its regulatory status.
Computer I answered the question of whether networked data
processing systems were subject to the same rules as communications
carriers. Under the regime of common carriage, communications
network operators at the time were subject to extensive oversight,
203
including tariffing and rate regulation. Because the line between
ordinary competitive companies and regulated carriers was so stark,
the classification of a service as being on one side or the other was
momentous. Companies might not even be allowed to operate if their
service was declared to involve regulated common carriage, or they
might be subject to extensive regulatory obligations.
Moreover, in a 1956 antitrust consent decree, AT&T agreed to
204
limit itself to offering regulated communications services. The

201. See Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270 (1971) (declining to regulate
computers but maintaining regulations over communications under the Communications Act).
This was later refined by the FCC into a division between “basic” and “enhanced” services. See
Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 386 (1980) (final decision) (distinguishing “three categories of
service—voice, ‘basic non-voice’ (BNV) and ‘enhanced non-voice’ (ENV)”); Cannon, supra
note 56, at 183 (“Out of the analytical turmoil over classification of these services was born the
basic versus enhanced services dichotomy.”). In 1996, Congress ratified the FCC framework,
creating analogous statutory categories of “telecommunications” and “information services.”
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(2), § 153(41), (48), 110 Stat. 56,
59, 60 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (43) (2006)).
202. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 148–52 (“[T]he time has now arrived when it
becomes possible to consider computer power to be a likely candidate for admission to the
public-utility club.”); Irwin, supra note 153, at 1308 (“If the FCC is to prevent the carriers from
using its regulations to foreclose market entry, the Commission must either make it clear that
communications services ancillary to data processing are outside its jurisdiction or else assume
authority over computer utilities and begin regulating entrants from the data processing field.”);
Manley R. Irwin, The Computer Utility: Market Entry in Search of Public Policy, 17 J. INDUS.
ECON. 239, 252 (1969) (“Two options are clearly open to time-shared computer services:
competition or regulation.”); Manley R. Irwin, The Regulatory Status of the Computer Utility, 43
LAND ECON. 223, 224 (1967) (“If nothing else, the FCC’s investigation poses the fundamental
question; is the computer utility destined to become a regulated utility?”).
203. See WYMAN, supra note 128, at 115–16 (describing the legal demands placed on
telephone systems because they have virtual monopolies on providing communications
services); see also Werbach, supra note 83, at 1246–50 (“[C]ommon carriage concepts were
incorporated wholesale into the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act), which created the
Federal Communications Commission.”).
204. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246, ¶ 71,138 (D.N.J.) (“A
T & T is enjoined and restrained from engaging . . . in any business other than the furnishing of
common carrier communications services . . . .”); see also Susan P. Crawford, Transporting
Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 888–91 (2009) (discussing the implications of the 1956
consent decree).
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dominant provider of common carrier communications services was
thus barred from entering into unregulated lines of business, a
restriction that would endure until the 1990s. If data processing was
not a common carrier service, AT&T could not participate in the
market. If, on the other hand, it was construed as falling within the
regulatory scope of Title II of the Communications Act, remote data
processing could only be offered by regulated common carriers. The
computer utility marketplace was therefore either an unregulated
space open only to new entrants or a market limited to the major
incumbent. Competition and regulation were two mutually exclusive
alternatives.
The announced goal of Computer I was to consider regulation of
205
data processing services. In other words, the original question was
when and how such services might be brought within the ambit of the
Communications Act. In the end, the FCC chose to define data
206
processing as an unregulated offering. It found that “the offering of
data processing services is essentially competitive and . . . there is no
public interest requirement for regulation by government of such
207
activities.” Because competition and regulation were seen as
alternatives at the time, finding data processing to be competitive
208
implied that it was not appropriate for communications regulation.
The FCC thus found that providers of networked data processing
services would not be treated as carriers. It concluded that “the
market for these services [would] continue to burgeon and flourish
209
best in the existing competitive environment.” The computer utility
would develop outside of Title II of the Communications Act.
For companies already within Title II of the Communications
Act, the decision had significant consequences as well. One important

205. See Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 15–16 (1966) (stating a goal of identifying “under
what circumstances data processing, computer information, and message switching services, or
any particular combination thereof—whether engaged in by established common carriers or
other entities—are or should be subject to the provisions of the Communications Act”).
206. See Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 268 (“[W]e are not attempting to assert
jurisdiction over common carriers as purveyors of computer services . . . .”).
207. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 297 (1970). The FCC cited estimates
that there were more than eight hundred data processing service bureaus in operation, that
more than five thousand data processing companies sold excess computer time and capacity on
their systems, and that over one thousand banks offered data processing capacity to their
customers. Id. at 297–98. It also found that the required capital to enter the market was low and
that the market was growing quickly. Id.
208. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
209. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 298.
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effect was to bar AT&T from entering the computer utility market,
210
because of the 1956 consent decree. Other common carriers such as
GTE and Western Union had no such prohibition, but the FCC
created special obligations for their provision of data processing. The
common carriers could do so only under terms of “maximum
separation”—by establishing structurally separate entities that would
211
The carriers
deal at arms-length with the regulated carrier.
considered these restrictions so onerous that they challenged them in
court, pointing out that the FCC was attempting to regulate carriers’
212
provision of the very thing it had disclaimed any desire to regulate.
The Second Circuit eventually threw out some of the more extreme
213
limitations, but it upheld the FCC’s basic decisions.
3. Lessons of a Marriage Counselor. Computer I had important
consequences. It drew a regulatory line for the first time between the
regulated world of communications and the unregulated world of
computer processing. It prevented AT&T and the other major
telephone companies from dominating the computer utility
marketplace by virtue of their size and advantages of incumbency.
The result of what Professor Steve Bickerstaff calls the “shackling” of
AT&T was to allow the data networking market to develop along a
214
different path: more distributed, independent, and small-scale. Data
networking delivered in this manner was a perfect fit for the PC when
it arrived because it had never been tied to the model of large
mainframes and dumb terminals that network operators envisioned in

210. See id. at 298–99 n.2 (discussing the effect of the consent decree on AT&T).
211. Id. at 302–04.
212. See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730–32 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing GTE’s
various challenges to the regulations).
213. See id. at 733–37. Although GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973),
limited the FCC’s authority to impose specific restrictions on unregulated data processing
activities, it confirmed the FCC’s jurisdiction to address data processing services that threatened
to undermine its regulatory scheme for common carriers. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 555–57
(addressing regulatory concerns relating to the Internet).
214. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 61 (1999) (“It is
reasonable to believe that, had it been positioned to do so, the Bell System would have been
vigorous in its effort to curtail, delay, or defeat the challenge posed by personal computers and,
to some extent, its effort would have included the development and implementation of network
software and products designed to match or surpass what was available on personal
computers.”).
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the 1960s. The modern PC and Internet markets developed as a
216
direct result of the FCC’s actions in Computer I.
The competitive dynamics in the communications and computing
industries since the 1960s, however, should not obscure the
realization that animated the FCC’s inquiry: the two fields are
inextricably interconnected. Bernard Strassburg, who at the time of
Computer I served as chief of the FCC Common Carrier Bureau,
described the FCC’s role in the proceeding as similar to that of a
217
“marriage counselor.” Much as a married couple’s relationship
evolves over time, dividing lines for computing and communication
need to be reevaluated as market conditions change. The FCC
revised the distinction between regulated and unregulated services in
218
Computer II. But it has not returned squarely to the fundamental
question of when “data processing . . . should be subject to the
219
provisions of the Communications Act.”
Moreover, the question of data processing regulation was, and is,
not limited to whether such services are best treated as regulated
common carrier offerings. In Computer I, the FCC also considered
two other dimensions: service requirements for the communications
220
inputs to unaffiliated data processing providers and data privacy.
The FCC found it unnecessary to resolve these questions in Computer

215. A dumb terminal refers to an end-user computer that draws on a more powerful
computer elsewhere on the network for its information, rather than performing significant
processing itself.
216. See Bickerstaff, supra note 214, at 60–61 (discussing “the impact of Computer I on the
commercial success of personal computers and the advent of services that has accompanied that
success”).
217. Bernard Strassburg, Competition and Monopoly in the Computer and Data
Transmission Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 991, 991 (1968).
218. See Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies
Compete: A Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and Information
Service Providers, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49, 56 (2001) (“Basic telecommunication falls
under Title II of the Communications Act and is subject to common carrier regulation and
obligations. Enhanced services, in contrast, . . . are ‘unregulated’ by the Commission.”).
219. Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 15–16 (1966). The debate over the FCC’s jurisdiction
over broadband Internet access addresses essentially the same issue, but it is framed very
differently. See Werbach, supra note 48, at 541–45 (describing the expansion of the Internet and
corresponding regulations). Having defined a particular instantiation of data processing that
involves telecommunications as an integrated information service, the FCC is now seeking ways
to pull it back into the statutory framework. Broadband, however, is only a limited subset of the
Internet. See supra Part I.A.
220. See Calvin Davison, Stephen L. Babcock & John D. Leshy, Computers and Federal
Regulation, 21 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 290–91 (1969) (describing the inquiry into each of these
subjects).
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221

I. The proceeding begun in 1968 continued for more than three
decades and through three major waves of decisions, but
communications inputs and privacy essentially dropped out of
consideration. Facts on the ground have caught up with the issues the
222
FCC raised in the 1968 Notice of Inquiry.
In subsequent stages of the Computer Inquiries, the FCC allowed
regulated carriers to offer what it called “enhanced services,” subject
223
first to structural separation, and then to nonstructural safeguards.
The Computer Inquiry regime survived the 1996 Act, but the FCC
eventually decided that the restrictions were unnecessary in the new
224
competitive deregulated marketplace.
D. The Internet Instead
The Computer Inquiry outlasted the circumstances of its birth;
the computer utility did not. The computer utility as a business
concept died with the disruption of the commercial time-sharing
225
industry in the recession of 1970–71. At the same time, researchers
moved on from the well-understood techniques of remote time
sharing to the novel challenge of internetworking. From a technical
standpoint, the work on Project MAC and other time-sharing systems
in the 1960s laid the groundwork for the ARPANet in the 1970s, the
NSFNet in the 1980s, and the commercial Internet in the 1990s and
beyond.
There was, however, an important shift from computer utility
systems to the direct precursors of the Internet. The time-sharing
systems were fundamentally centralized. The computer utility in its
original form was a way to give many users access to one machine
through a distributed collection of dumb terminals. The Internet is a
221. See Note, supra note 194, at 172–73 (“In 1966, the Federal Communications
Commission launched the Computer Inquiry to explore the broad range of regulatory and policy
problems generated by this technological development.”).
222. See infra Part III.B.
223. See Cannon, supra note 218, at 56–57 (describing the steps to becoming an enhanced
services provider under Computer I and Computer II).
224. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,875 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed
rulemaking) (“We decline to continue to impose any Computer Inquiry requirements on
facilities-based carriers in their provision of wireline broadband Internet access service.”).
225. See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, Economic Perspectives on the
History of the Computer Time-Sharing Industry, 1965–1985, 30 IEEE ANNALS HIST.
COMPUTING 16, 16 (2008) (“The [computer utility] rhetoric was remarkably like that of the
Internet’s early years, except that the predictions never came to pass.”).
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far more distributed system, built not around the mainframe but
226
around the minicomputer and the PC. The Internet as it actually
evolved is a mechanism for linking together these computers and
227
their networks into a seamless virtual system. The endpoints of the
Internet are computers capable of engaging in their own processing
and storage, and the “center” of the Internet does not exist because
the Internet protocols link many fully autonomous networks in a flat
228
topology.
The standard history of the Internet emphasizes the role of
idealistic, iconoclastic engineers in developing the network outside of
229
the regulated communications industry.
The computer utility
community in the 1960s, in contrast, was in the mainstream of
230
academic research and corporate R&D. Ironically, the vision of
communications and computing in the countercultural 1960s was a
centralized model controlled by the incumbents, whereas the Internet
that actually developed in the 1970s was a decentralized, distributed
system. The computer utility community failed to appreciate that a
system of the scale and scope they imagined could develop from the
bottom up through open standards and entrepreneurial creativity. On
the other hand, the engineers who built the Internet failed to
appreciate that their creation could not indefinitely operate outside of
the regulated communications infrastructure but would incorporate it.
The success of the Internet demonstrates the value of open
231
platforms. As the visionaries of the computer utility recognized,
226. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1089 (joking that the founders of Apple Computer
apparently failed to read the FCC’s pronouncement about centralized computer utilities).
227. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1250–57 (“Though widely described as one network, the
internet is actually a collection of several thousand independent networks, whose common
characteristic is an agreement to interconnect to deliver internet protocol (IP) datagrams.”).
228. See Werbach, supra note 25, at 348 (noting that the Internet is composed of
heterogeneous parts of layered and differing functionality).
229. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999) (noting that, to some,
“the system seemed at times to verge on anarchy,” without centralized direction); KATIE
HAFNER, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996)
(describing the Internet as a product of the efforts of both the Department of Defense and a
number of individuals unaffiliated with the government); McDonald, supra note 154, at 4
(describing a libertarian conception of the Internet in which, “[r]ather than being driven by the
initiative of governments and large corporations, new services would emerged [sic] from the
individual initiative of widely distributed users”).
230. See McDonald, supra note 154, at 2–3 (noting that the computer utility industry was
established and relatively mainstream in the 1960s).
231. See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1975–76
(2006) (noting that the Internet allows any computer or other information processor to become
a part of the network easily, providing millions with access to information).
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however, there are other important public policy issues to address.
The Internet protocol architecture deliberately excluded specialized
232
features for security and end-to-end reliability. The engineers who
designed the Internet decided that the costs of fossilizing those
mechanisms into the core protocols would exceed the benefits,
233
especially as the network evolved. Indeed, this end-to-end approach
234
has been a major factor in the Internet’s success. But this fact does
not mean that concerns such as privacy and robustness are
unimportant, especially because the Internet has reached a mass
market level of adoption. The computer utility community posited
these topics as important from the outset.
The story of the Internet as a purely private creation has always
left a great deal out. The predecessor network that demonstrated
workable packet switching and internetworking, ARPANet, was
235
primarily funded by an arm of the Department of Defense. The
civilian network that later superseded it, NSFNet, was also federally
funded and overseen. When the National Science Foundation (NSF)
transitioned away from public funding and management of core
Internet infrastructure in the early 1990s, it imposed transitional
requirements, such as universal backbone interconnection through
236
network access points (NAPs). Even as these early interventions
faded, their effects in shaping both the technical and business
practices of the Internet community have endured.

232. See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 90–103
(2010) (describing decisions made by the engineers designing the Internet not to implement the
most reliable features after weighing them against other considerations).
233. See id. at 93 (noting that the “costs of providing error control in the application
outweigh the benefits of doing so” for most applications).
234. See id. at 101 (“Providing a connectionless, unreliable datagram service at the Internet
layer, while placing connection-oriented functionality in transport-layer protocols operating
end-to-end between end hosts, makes the Internet more robust.”).
235. See ABBATE, supra note 229, at 43 (noting that ARPANet’s source of funding was the
Department of Defense’s computing wing, ARPA).
236. See Brett M. Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention
into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2001) (noting that the NSF and the
NSFNet “community” created a new architecture for managing interconnection services); Jay P.
Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We
Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name
System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 115–17 (2001) (noting that the privatization of NSFNet meant
that regional networks would have to choose a commercial backbone, rather than rely on a
central backbone, as they had before the NSF’s changes).
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A renewed look at Computer I provides a deeper understanding
of how regulatory decisions shaped the Internet. Computer I adopted
a quarantine strategy for data processing services. These services
were walled off from regulation, whereas the regulated carriers were
either disallowed from providing them entirely, as AT&T was, or
were subject to extensive structural restrictions, like the independent
carriers were. The limitations of this approach became apparent
237
quickly. The FCC thought it could establish a dividing line between
communications and data processing services by considering hybrid
238
offerings on a case-by-case basis. It was wrong. The exception
swallowed the rule because the distinction between computing and
communications became increasingly arbitrary as the communications
239
network became increasingly digital. Nonetheless, Computer I
remained on the books for close to a decade, until the FCC refined
240
the dividing line in its 1980 Computer II proceeding.
The FCC’s quarantine approach in Computer I allowed it to
avoid confronting the hard questions that the computer utility
visionaries raised back in the 1960s. The emerging data processing
firms such as Bunker Ramo were less concerned about avoiding
regulatory oversight than about using the power of the FCC to
modulate their relationships with powerful common carriers. As
unregulated users of the network, they were guaranteed access, but
they were limited to the service offerings the carriers developed. And
the public policy considerations the computer utilities themselves
raised had no place in a discussion purely focused on regulatory
boundaries.
The FCC’s regulatory structure has evolved to some degree, but
it has largely maintained the quarantine model first adopted in
Computer I. The Internet, however, is evolving much faster. Cloud
computing, one of the most significant developments in the Internet
industry, is recreating the computer utility. And as a result, the
regulatory concerns of the earlier debate have become relevant once
again.
237. See supra Part II.C.3.
238. See Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 276 (1971) (noting that the FCC would
evaluate the character of particular services on an ad hoc basis).
239. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1090–91 (noting that the FCC “declined even to
give illustrative examples to help map out the definitional territory”).
240. See Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 423–28 (1980) (final decision) (recognizing that “a
need exists to re-examine the definitional scheme established in the First Computer Inquiry in
order to provide greater market certainty”).
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III. UTILITY REDUX: TO THE CLOUD!
Every era generates new business forms in response to the
241
shifting costs of transportation and communications. Such economic
innovation sparks legal innovations to cabin potential abuses. Just as
copyright arose in response to the power of the English stationers’
guild in the 1700s, public utility regulation was a response to railroads
and telegraph operators in the 1900s. Something similar may be on
the horizon at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The convergence
of computing and communications is producing a phenomenon
known as “cloud computing.” Cloud computing is the foundation for
a new class of “network utilities,” which are in many ways the
realization of the computer utility vision of the 1960s. These network
utilities raise public policy questions similar to those considered in
Computer I. The FCC should develop a new regulatory agenda that
addresses both the ways cloud service providers depend on
communications utilities and the ways they function as public utilities
themselves.
A. The Rise of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is an approach that places application
processing and storage in network-based data centers, rather than in
242
end-user devices such as personal computers. There are many
potential applications for this technology. For example, instead of
running local email applications and downloading mail from an ISP to
their own hard drives, users can access email through Google’s Gmail,
a web-based service that stores messages on Google’s own Internet-

241. See generally THOMAS W. MALONE, THE FUTURE OF WORK (2004) (tracing the
evolution of business in response to falling communications costs).
242. ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS TO
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 4 (2009) (“[C]loud computing
involves the sharing or storage by users of their own information on remote servers owned or
operated by others and accessed through the Internet or other connections.” (emphasis
omitted)); Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, Version 15,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/clouddef-v15.pdf (“Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction.”); What Policymakers Should Know About
“Cloud Computing,” GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 20, 2009, 10:35 AM ET), http://
googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/03/what-policymakers-should-know-about.html (defining
cloud computing as “the movement of computer applications and data storage from the desktop
to remote servers”).
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based servers. Instead of running a sales force automation package
locally, a salesperson can log into Salesforce.com and access contact
244
and sales pipeline information over the Internet. And a startup such
as Smugmug, which hosts photos for over 150,000 paying customers,
can move from its own server array to Amazon.com’s cloud
infrastructure, saving $500,000 in storage costs and providing flexible
245
capacity for growth. In addition, major online services such as
Google and Facebook are growing into full-fledged platforms built on
top of huge reconfigurable pools of computing capacity. These
platforms can integrate services on a common data layer and glean
insights from user behavior across the system. They can also host
third-party applications, such as the thousands built on top of
Facebook.
246
There are many definitions of cloud computing, but there is
widespread agreement that the rise of cloud computing is producing
significant business, network infrastructure, and public policy
247
248
changes. Analysts predict huge growth in cloud computing. A
243. As of February 2010, Google had approximately 170 million Gmail users worldwide.
Google Takes on Facebook and Twitter with Network Site, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/8506148.stm (last updated Feb. 9, 2010, 7:56 PM GMT).
244. As of January 2011, Salesforce.com manages data for over 92,300 corporate customers.
Press Release, Salesforce.com, Salesforce.com Unveils Service Cloud 3, the Next Generation of
Social Contact Centers (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.salesforce.com/company/newspress/press-releases/2011/03/110303.jsp.
245. AWS Case Study: SmugMug, AMAZON WEB SERVS. (2006), http://aws.amazon.com/
solutions/case-studies/smugmug.
246. Cloud Computing: Clash of the Clouds, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 2009, at 80, 80–82.
247. See CARR, supra note 158, at 117 (noting that cloud computing and similar technology
will displace current business practices); Let It Rise, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REP.), Oct. 25, 2008,
at 3, 3 (noting that cloud computing “will allow digital technology to penetrate every nook and
cranny of the economy and of society, creating some tricky political problems along the way”);
Steve Lohr, I.B.M. to Push ‘Cloud Computing,’ Using Data from Afar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2007, at C7 (noting that IBM is investing a large, undisclosed amount in its cloud technology);
Daniel Lyons, Today’s Forecast: Cloudy, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2008, at 24, 24 (noting that “tech
giants” are “racing to deliver cloud products”); see also John Ciancutti, Four Reasons We
Choose Amazon’s Cloud as Our Computing Platform, THE NETFLIX TECH BLOG (Dec. 14,
2010, 9:35 AM), http://techblog.netflix.com/2010/12/four-reasons-we-choose-amazons-cloudas.html (explaining the business benefits that a leading online video distribution company found
in using a third-party cloud platform).
248. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud—
Whatever That May Mean, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1 (citing research firms predicting
annual cloud computing revenues between $42 billion and $160 billion in 2011–12).
The growth of cloud computing does not mean that all Internet-based services will
necessarily be centralized. The Internet is still an any-to-any network with no center. See VAN
SCHEWICK, supra note 232, at 383–87 (describing the shift away from the end-to-end
architecture of the original Internet); Werbach, supra note 25, at 351–53 (explaining how the

WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

THE NETWORK UTILITY

4/14/2011 6:24:49 PM

1813

substantial majority of Americans already use services such as
webmail, online data storage, and web-based productivity
249
applications that are considered cloud computing. Most experts
participating in a 2010 Pew Foundation Future of the Internet Survey
expected that within a decade, remote servers would be the primary
means of accessing applications and sharing information, rather than
250
local applications. As John Hagel and John Seely Brown of
Deloitte’s Center for the Edge stated, “Cloud computing has the
potential to generate a series of disruptions that will ripple out from
the tech industry and ultimately transform many industries around
251
the world.”
In the late 1990s, many websites resided on a single server
computer. Even very popular sites might have had only a handful of
servers fed by load-balancing software at a single location. In 2011,
the leading Internet companies build massive, multibillion dollar data
centers the size of several football fields, each housing thousands of
252
networked computers. A major service provider such as Google has
as many web-connected servers as the total number of machines that
were connected to the Internet in 1995, all linked into a colossal
253
virtual supercomputer. And Google is at the leading edge of a huge
Internet is “a network at war with itself” between centralizing and decentralizing forces). There
are countervailing trends toward distributed peer production at the same time as other services
are shifting to centralized cloud computing. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 384 (2006)
(identifying countervailing forces at the physical, logical, and content layers).
249. See John B. Horrigan, Cloud Computing Gains in Currency: Online Americans
Increasingly Access Data and Applications Stored in Cyberspace, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept.
12, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/948/cloud-computing-gains-in-currency (“Some 69% of
online Americans use webmail services, store data online, or use software programs such as
word processing applications whose functionality is located on the web.”); see also Christopher
Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web
2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 363 (2010) (“This computing model has
become firmly ingrained in the consciousness of consumers . . . .”).
250. Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (June 11, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1623/future-cloud-computingtechnology-experts.
251. John Hagel III & John Seely Brown, Cloud Computing’s Stormy Future, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 14, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/bigshift/2010/09/cloud-computings-stormyfuture.html.
252. See CARR, supra note 158, at 65 (noting that Google has established “server farms” at
covert locations around the world).
253. See Brian Barrett, Google’s Insane Number of Servers Visualized, GIZMODO (Apr. 14,
2010, 5:20 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5517041/googles-insane-number-of-servers-visualized
(noting that, with more than one million servers, “[i]t is speculated that Google owns more than
2% of all the world’s servers”). By comparison, in January 1995, the Internet had approximately
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trend. Smaller providers such as Twitter are building their own data
centers, whereas others are tapping into public clouds offered by
255
companies such as Amazon.com. All of the major online service
providers, as well as enterprises with their own existing data center
256
infrastructure, are all potential or actual cloud computing providers.
The rise of smart, connected mobile devices further feeds and
builds on the move toward cloud approaches. Due to their small size,
mobile phones do not have the same storage capacity as personal
computers. Even when used for services such as email or document
review, they are almost never a user’s sole computing device. Rather,
they provide a mobile window into the user’s data. As a result of
these two factors, virtually any application involving significant
amounts of user data on a mobile device will incorporate remote
storage and a cloud computing architecture. This is equally true for
mobile access to a consumer service, such as iTunes for music or Yelp
for local restaurant information, as it is for business applications such
257
as Salesforce.com or Google Docs.

five million host addresses and an estimated one million machines actually connected and
responding. Internet Growth: Raw Data, MIT, http://www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/internetgrowth-raw-data.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
254. See Gilder, supra note 175, at 202 (“The data centers these companies are building
began as exercises in making the planet’s ever-growing data pile searchable. Now, turbocharged
with billions in Madison Avenue mad money for targeted advertisements, they’re morphing into
general-purpose computing platforms, vastly more powerful than any built before.”).
255. Where the Cloud Meets the Ground, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REP.), Oct. 25, 2008, at 6, 6–
7.
256. See MICHAEL ARMBRUST, ARMANDO FOX, REAN GRIFFITH, ANTHONY D. JOSEPH,
RANDY H. KATZ, ANDREW KONWINSKI, GUNHO LEE, DAVID A. PATTERSON, ARIEL RABKIN,
ION STOICA & MATEI ZAHARIA, ABOVE THE CLOUDS: A BERKELEY VIEW OF CLOUD
COMPUTING 1 (2009) (distinguishing public and private clouds); JOHN HAGEL & JOHN SEELY
BROWN, DELOITTE CTR. FOR THE EDGE, CLOUD COMPUTING—STORMS ON THE HORIZON 5
(2010), available at http://www.johnseelybrown.com/cloudcomputingdisruption.pdf (describing
the evolution of cloud computing providers); Mell & Grance, supra note 242 (“The cloud
computing industry represents a large ecosystem of many models, vendors, and market
niches.”).
257. See Steven Cherry, Forecast for Cloud Computing: Up, Up, and Away, 46 IEEE
SPECTRUM 68, 68 (2009) (noting that a large portion of the recent increases in cell phone data
transmission and reception is due to cloud computing); Mobile Will Be Key to Unlock Cloud
Potential, MUSIC WK., July 17, 2010, at 9 (“The migration of music services into the cloud is
essential for the music business because of the growing importance of devices such as
smartphones that decentralise access for consumers.”).
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B. Clouds as Utilities
1. The New Computer Utilities. Cloud computing bears a striking
258
resemblance to the computer utility vision of the 1960s. Like
computer utilities, cloud data centers leverage economies of scale
from large quantities of centrally hosted computing power. In both
cases, the value proposition is that computing services delivered
across the network from a remote location will be superior to the
same services on a machine residing locally in a home or office. Both
systems employ technical mechanisms—time sharing in the 1960s and
virtualization in the 2000s—to make a single computer function like
multiple independent machines. Such techiques allow many users to
operate many different applications at the same time, without
dedicating specific machines to anyone. Both the computer utility and
cloud computing, in other words, create the illusion of a local,
dedicated machine. Providers in both models could sell computing
capacity on a usage basis, scaling up or down based on demand. And
in both cases, platform service providers have substantial control over
both services and the associated data and metadata.
There are certainly differences between the 1960s time-sharing
mainframes and the fungible pools of server blades operating in
Internet-connected data centers. The most sophisticated computer
utility systems, such as Project MAC, were vastly less powerful and
flexible than cloud platforms. The computer utility was primarily a
tool for scientific research and operational functions in companies,
managed by trained programmers. It was not a consumer
phenomenon like the Internet that supported entertainment,
productivity applications, social networking, and countless other
popular activities for ordinary individuals. And, importantly, the
computer utility did not have the Internet. Computer utility service
bureaus had to build their own private, proprietary data networks on
top of communications circuits. There was no common datanetworking platform that all users and all service providers could
259
utilize. Finally, it should not be overlooked that the reality of the

258. See Bickerstaff, supra note 214, at 85 (arguing that the computer utility vision
reappeared in network computing, a precursor to cloud computing).
259. Perhaps the computer utility failed initially in the marketplace for this reason. The
Internet had to develop as a connectivity platform before centralized service platforms could
take off through cloud computing.
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260

computer utility never matched the expansive visions of the 1960s,
whereas cloud computing generates billions of dollars of activity and
261
is poised to grow even further.
Cloud computing changes the relationship of users to their
applications and service providers to the network in a similar manner
to the old computer utility vision. For public policy, the economic and
social interactions that new technologies drive are what matters, not
the internal mechanics of those technologies. The computer utility
idea painted a picture for opinion leaders and policymakers of
ubiquitous computational capacity deliverable to a far wider range of
problems and users than was possible previously. For the FCC, it
raised questions about control of data and access to communications
resources that were both similar to and distinct from the telephone
network analogues.
Cloud computing similarly is changing the way people think
about both computers and computer networks. End-user devices can
be smaller and cheaper because they draw from network-based
services. This shift opened the door for new devices such as Apple’s
iPad, which was among the most successful consumer product
262
introductions in history. And the Internet has changed from a way
to push data from one point to another into an oasis from which
computing resources, applications, and personalized content can be
263
pulled on demand when needed. As policymakers consider what
cloud computing means, therefore, they can look back to the way
their predecessors evaluated similar questions.
The most fundamental analogy between the computer utility and
cloud computing is that both are utilities in the classic sense. In the
260. See CARR, supra note 158, at 59 (describing how early predictions that computing
would one day be organized as a public utility were held back by a lack of bandwidth).
261. See Steve Hilton, Cloud Computing Is No Fad, FORBES (July 12, 2010, 12:30 PM EDT),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/12/cloud-computing-growth-entrepreneurs-technologyinformationweeksmb.html (stating that the global market for enterprise cloud-based services
was $12.1 billion in 2010).
262. See Steve Monfort, Apple’s iPad a Runaway Sales Success, NASDAQ NEWS (Oct. 6,
2010, 7:18 AM), http://community.nasdaq.com/News/2010-10/apples-ipad-a-runaway-salessuccess.aspx (“Apple’s (AAPL) iPad tablet is the hottest-selling electronic device ever, a new
report from Bernstein Research shows.”). The iPad depends on a built-in wireless network
connection to obtain applications and content. See The iPad: What You Need to Know,
MACWORLD (Jan. 29, 2010, 6:05 PM), http://www.macworld.com/article/146020/2010/01/ipad_
faq.html (explaining the features of the iPad, including both Wi-Fi and 3G-enabled models).
263. See generally JOHN HAGEL III, JOHN SEELY BROWN & LANG DAVISON, THE POWER
OF PULL (2010) (explaining the business impacts of the move toward a “pull” model, with cloud
computing as one element supporting the shift).

WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

4/14/2011 6:24:49 PM

THE NETWORK UTILITY

1817

case of the computer utility, the connection is inherent in the term
itself. Proponents of the computer utility drew explicit parallels
between large-scale remote time-sharing systems and traditional
264
public utilities, such as electrical grids. Recognizing the limitations
of the analogy, they nonetheless envisioned that computer processing
would become nearly as important to society as power and water, and
265
they expected it to be delivered in a similar fashion. Douglas
Parkhill, author of the best-known book about the computer utility,
describes the connection as follows:
The word “utility” in the term “computer utility” has, of course,
the same connotation as it does in other more familiar fields such as
in electrical power utilities or telephone utilities and merely denotes
a service that is shared among many users, with each user bearing
266
only a small fraction of the total cost of providing that service.
267

The same framing is being applied to cloud computing. Former
268
Economist editor Nicholas Carr, in his 2008 book The Big Switch,
paints a detailed picture of cloud computing data centers as the
equivalent of electrical power plants in their economic and business
269
impacts. Carr points out that electricity was originally generated
locally by individual factories operating water wheels or other
270
mechanisms to serve their own needs. With the development of
large generators, the electric light, and electrical distribution
infrastructure, the economics shifted. It became far more efficient for

264. See Greenberger, supra note 1, at 64 (explaining the analogy between automatic
computation and electricity, and the limitations of that analogy).
265. Even during the heyday of the computer utility concept, some authors argued that
similarities to traditional regulated public utilities were overblown. See BARNETT, JR. ET AL.,
supra note 154, at 86–88 (“The conclusion is that present and foreseeable computer utilities are
not structured like public utilities . . . .”).
266. PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 3.
267. The utility framing is also being applied to services built on top of cloud computing
infrastructure. At a conference in early 2011, the CEO of the popular messaging service Twitter
compared his company’s offering to a public water utility: “‘It needs to be water. It’s instantly
useful. It’s simple. I don’t have to re-learn how to use water,’ he told the audience. ‘It’s always
present.’” Pamela Parker, Twitter as Utility, Like Running Water? That’s Goal, Says CEO,
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 14, 2011, 10:12 PM ET), http://searchengineland.com/twitter-asutility-like-running-water-thats-goal-says-ceo-64803.
268. CARR, supra note 158.
269. Id. at 14–16.
270. Id. at 15–16.
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large power plants to serve entire neighborhoods or cities than for
271
customers to invest in their own electrical generation.
Cloud computing, Carr argues, represents a similar shift away
from the decentralized model of the PC toward a power-plant
272
structure. No individual can bring to bear the same resources as
Google or Amazon.com. The financial investments, as well as the
specialized expertise such companies develop, further widen the gap.
Other systems start to be built around the centralized delivery of the
273
core resource, a process accelerated through standardization. In the
end, the central utility supplants the local generation model almost
everywhere. Computing is not exactly analogous to electricity, which
is completely undifferentiated and difficult to store. But the same
factors that led to the centralization of energy distribution are turning
networked computing into a service increasingly delivered by
centralized utilities.
2. Regulation in the Clouds. The rise of computing as a utility, in
the 1960s as well as in 2011, has significant regulatory implications.
The proponents of the computer utility were never slow to
acknowledge that their vision implied consideration of whether
computing service bureaus should be subject to the same sort of
public utility regulation as AT&T and other common carriers. Similar
pressure is building in the Internet era. Early in 2010, for example,
danah boyd, an influential sociologist at Microsoft Research, wrote a
274
blog post titled, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated. Her
argument was that the drumbeat of privacy concerns about social
networking services such as Facebook might most appropriately be
addressed through government action. The argument provoked
dozens of responses, most of which were fearful that government
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 14–16 (describing the additional systems built around centralized delivery of
electricity and noting the importance of technical standards).
274. danah boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated, APOPHENIA (May 15, 2010),
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/facebook-is-a-utility-utilities-getregulated.html [hereinafter boyd, Facebook Is a Utility]; see also danah boyd, Facebook’s
Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence, 14 CONVERGENCE 13, 13–14
(2008) (describing the concern generated by Facebook’s introduction of the News Feed
feature). It is arguable whether Facebook is a cloud-computing platform. The definition of the
term is somewhat loose, however, and Facebook is a huge network-based platform for remote
storage, processing, and application hosting. See Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in
Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 2–3 (2008) (describing the overlap
between the shift to Web 2.0, which includes Facebook, and cloud computing).
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275

regulation would crush Internet innovation. Indeed, governments
around the world spent thirty years privatizing and liberalizing
lumbering public utilities, and the Internet has been held up as a
shining example of private enterprise.
But boyd was on to something. Cloud computing platforms are
utilities, in a very real sense. At the same time, they are competitive
services that have thrived in the absence of communications
regulation and depend on the public utility treatment of
communications carriers for access to their customers. As the Internet
increasingly becomes a distribution platform for centralized services,
utility regulation should be the starting point for public policy
discussions.
Significant public policy questions have already arisen around
cloud computing. For example, the Electronic Communications
276
Privacy Act (ECPA) requires law enforcement actors to obtain a
search warrant if they wish to access email stored on a user’s hard
drive, but it applies a much lower standard when that same email has
been stored for more than six months on Google’s Gmail servers,
277
even though the user sees a parallel experience. When email was
primarily something that users accessed locally—as it was in 1986,
when ECPA was adopted—the statutory distinction may have made
some sense. In 2011, when a huge and growing percentage of email is
never copied onto a local hard drive, it no longer does. In December
2010, the Sixth Circuit held that email stored remotely by ISPs and on
cloud computing clusters is entitled to the same warrant requirements
for government searches as locally stored messages under the Stored
278
Communications Act provisions of ECPA. The issue seems likely to
275. boyd, Facebook Is a Utility, supra note 274.
276. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
277. See Soghoian, supra note 249, at 390–91 (explaining how the Fourth Amendment’s
third-party doctrine offers little protection for users of electronic remote file storage services,
given that the government can compel providers of such services to reveal their customers’
private documents with a subpoena); David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying
Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2205, 2215 (2009) (noting that the third-party doctrine is especially relevant in the cloud
computing world, in which information is turned over to third-party cloud service providers with
increasing frequency); William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1227 (2010) (describing how
Congress relied extensively on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in drafting the ECPA’s
privacy protections).
278. United States v. Warshak, Nos. 08-3997, 08-4085, 08-4087, 08-4212, 08-4429, 09-3176,
2010 WL 5071766, at *14 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010).
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go before the Supreme Court, if Congress does not restructure ECPA
first.
Other impacts of cloud platforms are more subtle but, in the long
run, more substantial. The cloud represents the full integration of
computing and communications. Cloud platforms are simultaneously
the network’s edge and its core; they thus pose a fundamental
challenge to both the technical and legal assumptions about the
Internet. Companies considering using cloud computing services for
their data and applications must consider a variety of legal and policy
279
considerations regarding the treatment of their data. On one level,
cloud providers are simply online intermediaries, subject to
contractual relationships with users and other service providers. From
a broader perspective, though, the rise of cloud computing changes a
default assumption that data will be within the control of the user.
The 2010–11 controversy over Wikileaks, a website that
anonymously disseminates leaked documents, put a further spotlight
280
on cloud platforms. Wikileaks moved its content to the Amazon
Web Services cloud-hosting platform when it faced denial-of-service
attacks over its controversial distribution of thousands of leaked U.S.
281
State Department diplomatic cables.
Not long after, perhaps
responding to pressure from U.S. government figures, Amazon.com
282
dropped Wikileaks as a customer. Wikileaks itself may be a shady
operation, but Amazon.com’s willingness to cut it off raised concerns
that, in a cloud computing world, freedom of speech and corporate
business continuity are at the whims of a network platform
283
provider. As the federal agency concerned with promotion of
innovation, economic activity, and democratic discourse through
communications networks, the FCC cannot ignore this debate.
Growing dependence on cloud computing platforms will thus
make regulatory concerns about these platforms increasingly salient.

279. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Cloud Computing Creates Legal Tangles, TECHWORLD
(Aug. 3, 2010, 4:31 PM GMT), http://features.techworld.com/data-centre/3234162/cloudcomputing-creates-legal-tangles.
280. Ben Rooney, Amazon’s WikiLeaks Response Threatens Cloud Computing, WALL ST. J.
TECH EUR. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010, 10:26 AM GMT), http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2010/12/
13/amazons-wikileaks-response-threatens-cloud-computing.
281. Charlie Savage, Amazon Cites Terms of Use in Expulsion of WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2010, at A10.
282. See id. (describing Amazon.com’s reasoning).
283. See, e.g., Eugene Robinson, A Wiki Hornets’ Nest, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2010, at A23
(“At stake are issues of free speech, censorship, privacy, sovereignty and corporate power.”).
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As Carr points out, access to the electrical grid was initially a luxury
284
for companies, but it quickly became essential. Something similar
may well happen for many software applications delivered through
cloud services. All of the major categories of end-user desktop
software, from email to word processing to databases to games, are
being provided on a large scale through cloud computing. Web
search, a service that could be delivered no other way, is a dominant
285
force in the Internet economy. Even the U.S. government is making
286
a strong push to move federal IT systems to the cloud. When
systems become so mission critical, regulators must address the public
policy concerns they raise. The mechanisms will be less drastic than
the government-ownership or common-carrier regulation applied to
traditional public utilities, but cloud platforms should be subject to
reasonable policies to promote the public interest.
For at least three reasons, cloud computing is likely to produce
the same kinds of dependencies that animated public utility
regulation in other industries. First, there are significant economies of
scale in delivering application functionality through large remote data
centers. Service providers can operate, configure, and update a
centrally managed collection of resources more efficiently than
287
individual users responsible for their own personal computers.
Backup, business continuity, security, and other utility functions are

284. See CARR, supra note 158, at 43–44 (explaining how Chicago’s manufacturers were
pressured to switch to centrally provided electricity due to its significant savings in costs,
personnel, and management attention).
285. See, e.g., GOOGLE, GOOGLE’S ECONOMIC IMPACT: UNITED STATES 2009 (2010),
available at http://www.google.com/economicimpact/pdf/google_economicimpact.pdf (“Google
generated $54 billion of economic activity for American businesses, website publishers and nonprofits in 2009.”); see also HAMILTON CONSULTANTS, INC. WITH JOHN DEIGHTON & JACK
QUELCH, ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ADVERTISING-SUPPORTED INTERNET ECOSYSTEM 27
(2009), available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/Economic-Value-Report.pdf (showing that
web-search is a significant segment of Internet business and the fifth largest overall).
286. See Jessica Rettig, U.S. Government Takes a Step Toward Cloud Computing, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/12/06/usgovernment-takes-a-step-toward-cloud-computing (describing a new White House–led effort to
encourage federal agencies to choose cloud-computing options).
287. See Ian Foster, Carl Kesselman, Jeffrey M. Nick & Steven Tuecke, Grid Services for
Distributed System Integration, COMPUTER, June 2002, at 37, 40 (“Unlike yesterday’s computing
services companies, which tended to provide offline batch-oriented processes, today’s e-utilities
often provide resources that both enterprise computing infrastructures and in-house and
outsourced business processes use. Thus, one consequence of exploiting the economies of scale
that e-utility structures enable is further decomposition and distribution of enterprise computing
functions.”); see also Brian Hayes, Cloud Computing, COMM. ACM, July 2008, at 9, 11
(describing the challenge of scalability in cloud computing).
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significantly more efficient if deployed across a large virtualized cloud
of computers. The cost is shared across all of the customers, and the
cloud provider can develop expertise beyond that of individual
companies.
Second, because it allows many users to share large utility
computing clusters, cloud computing is a better solution when
288
demand fluctuates. Consider a startup launching a new web-based
service. It has to ensure that it has enough processing and storage
capacity to meet user demand. If the company must provision servers
itself, there may be a substantial cost and delay to increase capacity if
it underestimates demand. And if the company overestimates
demand, it will spend unnecessary resources provisioning servers that
it does not use. In one case, the service may crash, and in the other,
the company wastes money. Neither is an attractive outcome.
Moreover, demand forecasting is a constant exercise. What if the
company runs a special promotion that causes a short-term spike in
289
usage? Or what if it offers an enterprise service that is lightly used
on the weekends? No individual company can match supply and
demand as efficiently as a cloud-based aggregator of capacity.
In a cloud-computing environment, on the other hand,
companies share virtual capacity in massive clouds. The scale of the
cloud platforms makes capacity a commodity for the provider, so
overprovisioning does not create the same difficulties as it does for
individual companies. The cloud provider can also deploy
virtualization software and other technical mechanisms to more
290
efficiently utilize its capacity.
Aggregation of demand across
different services with different requirements naturally tends to
smooth out spikes. Especially in a fast-changing environment, the
cloud approach therefore provides a more efficient and higherperforming solution than companies could provide through local selfprovisioning.
Third, cloud computing allows the service provider to capture
and aggregate large volumes of user data. This information can help
the service provider improve its service, or it can open up new
288. See Michael Armbrust, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith, Anthony D. Joseph, Randy Katz,
Andy Konwinski, Gunho Lee, David Patterson, Ariel Rabkin, Ion Stoica & Matei Zaharia, A
View of Cloud Computing, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2010, at 50, 52–53 (describing the importance of
having adequate computing resources to handle demand fluctuations).
289. See id.
290. Mladen A. Vouk, Cloud Computing—Issues, Research and Implementations, 16 J.
COMPUTING & INFO. TECH. 235, 237–38 (2008).
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business opportunities. Gmail, which generates revenue through
targeted advertisements, is a good example. Google does not need to
charge for its email service, even though the gigabytes of storage it
offers to users are not costless to provide. Instead, Google monetizes
Gmail by algorithmically matching message text to targeted
291
advertisements. Google can make this model work only because it
can aggregate large numbers of ads and large volumes of email text in
the same computing environment as its analytical software.
3. The Deregulatory Dance. The FCC has, to date, not taken
interest in these developments the way it confronted the computer
utility concept in the 1960s. There are several reasons it has not. The
cloud computing market is still new and fast-changing. The market
leaders, such as Amazon.com, Salesforce.com, Microsoft, and Google,
are pure information technology firms, not communications
292
carriers. Though some of them are now very large companies, no
one player dominates the market, and none appears to control an
293
essential competitive input. Barriers to entry are low, and new
entrants such as Twitter can quickly grow into major forces. Rules
291. Jason Isaac Miller, Note, “Don’t Be Evil”: Gmail’s Relevant Text Advertisements
Violate Google’s Own Motto and Your E-mail Privacy Rights, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1607, 1612–
14 (2005).
292. Telecommunications networks have traditionally been subject to government
requirements to provide nondiscriminatory access. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public
Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 70 (2008) (describing nondiscriminatory access
regimes). The rationale for doing so has never been definitely established. Professor Thomas
Nachbar has examined three common arguments for the public network concept—necessity,
holding out, and market power—and has found them all wanting. Id. at 79. Instead, he
emphasizes the value of nondiscrimination rules to reduce transaction costs and promote
standardization. Id. at 108–09.
293. The essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law gives the government the authority to
impose remedies when a company exercises bottleneck control over an element that is essential
for competitive entry. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Essential Facilities Doctrine, in ANTITRUST
LAW & ECONOMICS 157, 157 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010) (explaining that the essential facilities
doctrine requires a monopolist to provide competitors with access to a facility if that access is
essential for effective competition); J. Gregory Sidak & Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Essential
Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91 (1999) (explaining that the central principle of the
essential facilities doctrine is that a monopolist must provide reasonable access to a facility
essential to other competitors if it is feasible to do so).
The doctrine suffered a serious blow from the Supreme Court in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004).
Some scholars have attempted to rehabilitate the doctrine, especially as applied to
communications infrastructure and the Internet. See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber
Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8 (2008) (“The best cases for the
essential facilities model typically involve the denial of access to infrastructure and networks,
particularly in the context of regulated industries in transition.”).
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designed for the slow-moving, highly concentrated public-utility
world seem a poor fit. The most significant reason, however, is the
shift away from intrusive regulation of monopolies toward facilitation
294
of competition as a central regulatory goal.
The period in which the FCC adopted Computer I represented
the turning point toward this new approach to communications
regulation. The FCC’s decision not to treat data processing as a
communications service was based on its recognition of the limits of
that regulatory box. As the FCC stated,
Government intervention and regulation are limited to those areas
where there is a natural monopoly, where economies of scale are of
such magnitude as to dictate the need for a regulated monopoly, or
where such other factors are present to require governmental
intervention to protect the public interest because a potential for
295
unfair practices exists.

None of these factors was true for the computer utilities in the 1960s,
and none is true for modern cloud computing providers. Again, it was
in Computer I that these two threads of skepticism of regulation and
skepticism about its absence came together for the converging worlds
of communications and computing.
Computer I was never really a fight over whether the FCC would
regulate independent data processing companies. Despite the broad
framing of the proceeding, blanket regulation of data processing
296
services was never actually on the table. No commenters seriously
argued that all remote data processing should be considered a
297
regulated common carrier offering. In its decision, the FCC quickly
concluded that “the offering of data processing services is essentially
competitive,” and that no regulation was needed when unregulated
298
companies provided those services. It spent the bulk of its efforts
setting out the justification and specific terms for regulation of
common carriers in their interaction with the data processing market.

294. See supra Part II.A.
295. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 297 (1970).
296. See Dunn, supra note 198, at 380 (calling this possibility “only hypothetical” and “not
seriously considered by any of the respondents to the inquiry”).
297. Id.
298. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. It offered a caveat: “[h]owever, if
there should develop significant changes in the structure of the data processing industry, or, if
abuses emerge which require the exercise of corrective action by the Commission, we shall not
hesitate to re-examine the policies set forth herein.” Id. at 298.
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The important decisions in Computer I involved not the
unregulation of data processing services, but the regulation of the
network operators on which they depended. The FCC recognized that
computer utilities and other remote data processing services needed
communications circuits to deliver their offerings to customers. And it
recognized that carriers might fail to provide those circuits or to
provide them in a discriminatory manner, especially if the carriers
were themselves competitors in the data processing market. That,
after all, was the lesson of the Bunker Ramo incident. As the FCC
stated, “The dangers identified by respondents and by the SRI study
relate primarily to the alleged ability of common carriers to favor
their own data processing activities by discriminatory services, cross
subsidization, improper pricing of common carrier services, and
299
related anticompetitive practices and activities.”
Intriguingly, one of the arguments against regulation of
computer utilities was that, if they were classified as carriers, the
terms of their interconnection with other carriers would be outside
300
the FCC’s jurisdiction. It was not until the FCC began the process of
allowing MCI to interconnect with AT&T for competitive longdistance service, and until the courts and Congress eventually
changed their approach to internetwork interconnection, that such
questions came within the FCC’s purview. In other words, the FCC’s
refusal to regulate data processing services in Computer I was based
on more than its stated desire to avoid unnecessary intrusion into a
301
competitive market.
The FCC had to keep data processing
unregulated as a basis for regulating the essential inputs supporting
that market.
The FCC was not ignorant of the regulatory concerns that
networked data processing services posed. Nor did it consider the
computer utility outside of its jurisdictional authority. It made the
justifiable decision that the potential harms of regulating a nascent,
competitive industry exceeded the potential benefits of such
regulation. Common carrier regulation at the time meant far more
extensive government intrusion than even the most dominant
incumbent network operators experience in 2011. And although
299. Id. at 301–02.
300. See Manley I. Irwin, Federal Regulations and Monopoly, in COMPUTERS AND
COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 156, at 199, 206 (“The Federal Communications Commission
generally regards carrier-to-carrier leasing arrangements as beyond its jurisdiction, and appeals
to Congress for legislative authority to acquire this jurisdiction have so far been unsuccessful.”).
301. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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experts such as Parkhill and Professor Fano described the significance
302
of the computer utility in expansive terms, data processing service
bureaus were a small, specialized industry at the time of Computer I,
especially compared to the massive AT&T and other regulated
communications carriers. There was no guarantee that the computer
utility would reach its potential, and indeed, the centralized vision of
the 1960s was never realized.
The FCC’s decision to address the inputs to networked data
processing services, rather than the policy considerations of those
services, in Computer I should be understood within its historical
context. It was not a conclusion that computer-based services should
never be the subjects of communications policy. Nonetheless,
dominant network operators are using the very categories the FCC
crafted for data processing startups to escape from obligations
designed to protect the innovative potential of those startups’
descendants.
C. The Network Utility Agenda
As William Shakespeare famously wrote, “What’s past is
303
prologue.” Just as the FCC in 1968 had to balance regulation,
deregulation, and unregulation in a fast-changing technological
environment, the FCC in 2011 must confront the development of
cloud computing platforms into network utilities. Just as the FCC in
1968 faced market realities mismatched with the statutory language of
its jurisdictional delegation, so too did the FCC in 2011. In the
Computer I Tentative Decision, the FCC set the appropriate standard
for resolving such conundrums: “we should look to the basic purpose
of regulatory activity in the context of our general national policy, as
304
well as the specific statutory guidelines given this agency.” The
solution to the contemporary challenges of cloud computing likely
requires some legislative reform in addition to FCC action. Either
way, a clear sense of objectives will be important to frame the issues
and avoid missteps.
The FCC’s engagement with the Internet has focused
increasingly on the end-user connection to the network, as well as on
competition and investment in broadband access. The network

302. See supra notes 163–66, 264–66 and accompanying text.
303. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1, l. 247 (Yale Univ. Press 2006).
304. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297.
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neutrality controversy epitomizes this emphasis. As important as
those questions are, they represent only a limited subset of the issues
that the FCC must address as the Internet and communications
converge. The concerns about user protections and competition in the
broadband-access market may well be temporary, because they hinge
on limited competition. If the FCC is successful in promoting
competition, the concerns about network neutrality abate. Network
neutrality has thus been far less of a controversy in Europe, where
open access policies have resulted in significantly more competition in
306
broadband access.
In contrast, interactions within the network may not be
amenable to a competitive solution. Recall the Comcast–Level 3 fight
307
over charges to carry Netflix video traffic.
Comcast had a
terminating-access monopoly on the connection to its customers. No
matter how many broadband access competitors there were, Level 3
was still forced to use Comcast’s last-mile connection to reach
customers who had chosen Comcast as their broadband access
provider. If Comcast’s charges distorted the market and unreasonably
restricted Level 3 or Netflix, competition cannot be the solution. Only

305. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
306. See Martin Cave & Pietro Crocioni, Does Europe Need Network Neutrality Rules?, 1
INT’L J. COMM. 669, 669 (2007) (“[O]ne of the chief reasons for the lack of panic [over network
neutrality] in Europe is the presence of a fairly robust and comprehensive regulatory
framework . . . .”); Kenneth R. Carter, J. Scott Marcus, Adam J. Peake & Tomoaki Watanabe,
A Comparison of Network Neutrality Approaches in: The U.S., Japan, and the European Union
19–22 (July 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658093
(“The European communications market is a relatively competitive environment. . . . This
success in competitive alternatives stems from a European emphasis on pro-competitive and
explicitly technologically neutral regulation[, which] is at the heart of the EU
approach. . . . There have been few calls for additional obligations assuring Network Neutrality
in the market, and [there have been] no prominent cases of discriminatory behaviour against
content operators.”); Neelie Kroes, Vice-President for the Digital Agenda, Eur. Comm’n, Net
Neutrality—The Way Forward, Speech at the European Commission and European Parliament
Summit on “The Open Internet and Net Neutrality in Europe” 2 (Nov. 11, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/643&format=PDF&age
d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (“A healthy competitive environment allows tackling
many potential problems at their root, avoiding the emergence of monopolistic gatekeepers
which could create serious dangers for net neutrality. This is why the debate is different [in
Europe] than in the United States.”). The level of concern about network neutrality in Europe
does appear to have increased, however. See Council Directive 2009/140/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337)
37, 69 (EC) (declaring that the European Commission “attaches high importance to preserving
the open and neutral character of the Internet” and that it “will monitor closely the
implementation of these provisions in the Member States, introducing a particular focus on how
the ‘net freedoms’ of European citizens are being safeguarded”).
307. See supra Part I.B.
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direct oversight of the network interconnection relationships can
address the problem. This is a familiar situation in
308
telecommunications regulation. Additionally, competition may hurt
more than it helps with concerns such as privacy, if it produces a race
to the bottom among providers.
By focusing on competition and network neutrality, therefore,
the FCC may be missing larger concerns. The FCC should broaden its
focus to the evolving Internet platform, which is integrally connected
to the communications networks over which it has oversight
responsibilities. It should relax its sharp distinction between regulated
and unregulated services and hone in on the major competitive, proinnovation, and consumer-protection issues for a network of cloud
services fed by communications carriers. Although it is impossible to
anticipate all of the issues that will arise, four major categories of
concerns present themselves. All of them were present in the
computer utility debates before and during Computer I.
1. Connectivity.
The convergence of computing and
communications means that networked data services are dependent
on communications inputs. The first concern for cloud computing
services, as it was for computer utilities in the 1960s, is the availability
of nondiscriminatory access to networks.
A carrier might block or discriminate against data processing
309
services in the provision of network connectivity for several reasons.
It might simply wish to collect rents from upstream providers, a
practice that Chicago School antitrust scholars generally consider
308. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Network Competition: I.
Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing, 29 RAND J. ECON. 1, 2 (1998) (“Unconstrained
interconnection negotiations raise two concerns. First, it is often suggested that during the
transition toward competition, entrants may be handicapped by the incumbent’s reluctance to
provide access to its network on a reciprocal basis and at a reasonable price. Second, some
wonder whether, in the mature phase, established networks could not use their interconnection
agreements to enforce collusive behavior.”); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a
Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 91–102 (2008)
(“Interconnection access disrupts network management to a much greater degree than retail
and wholesale access.”). See generally Glen O. Robinson & Dennis L. Weisman, Designing
Competition Policy for Telecommunications, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 509 (2008) (describing the
essential facilities doctrine and its dynamic relationship with network sharing).
309. See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 232, at 218–73 (“[A] discriminatory network enables a
network provider to engage in noncooperative strategic behavior.”). See generally Joseph
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003)
(explaining why platform owners might overly restrict or discriminate against activities on their
platforms, despite the strong incentives to the contrary).
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310

acceptable. Alternatively, the carrier might see the data processing
service as being in actual or potential competition with its own core
activities. AT&T and Western Union made this argument in the
311
Bunker Ramo incident. The argument against competition had far
more force at that time because telephone service was a regulated
monopoly. Companies such as AT&T bore special burdens in part
because, at least in theory, the absence of competition allowed for
necessary network investment and universal service. In 2011, carriers
cannot claim the right to exclude competitors as part of a grand
regulatory compact. Competition is the norm rather than the
exception. Carriers that block or discriminate in this manner are
simply protecting their turf against competitive incursion. The
regulatory question is therefore whether such actions should be
blocked as an improper exercise of market power.
The carrier might participate in the data processing market itself.
As both a supplier and a competitor, the carrier would have
incentives to disadvantage an unaffiliated data processing service or
312
to cross-subsidize its own competitive offerings. This was not an
option for AT&T after Computer I. But it was the subject of much of
the discussion in that proceeding, because other regulated common
carriers also wished to offer computer utility services. The FCC in
313
Computer I used a structural solution. It required common carriers

310. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
225–31 (1978) (“Vertical mergers are means of creating efficiency, not of injuring competition.
There is a faint theoretical case . . . that vertical mergers can be used by very large firms for
purposes of predation under exceptional circumstances, but it is highly doubtful that that
narrow possibility has any application to reality.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
223–29 (2d ed. 2001) (“Were vertical integration deemed a suspect practice . . . , all commercial
activity would be placed under a cloud as the courts busied themselves redrawing the
boundaries of firms, even though the normal motivation for and consequence of vertical
integration are merely to reduce the transaction costs involved in coordinating production by
means of contracts with other firms.”); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK,
ANTITRUST 557–58 (2d ed. 1981).
311. See supra Part II.C.1.
312. The vertical leveraging theory has been the subject of substantial academic debate. See
DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
ECONOMICS AND LAW 143–51 (2009) (critiquing the concept).
313. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 302 (1970) (“[W]e are hereby
adopting a policy that communications common carriers shall furnish data processing services
only through separate corporate entities.”). Interestingly, the FCC observed that the major
interstate common carriers, such as GTE and Western Union, had already been voluntarily
offering their data processing services through separate subsidiaries before Computer I was
adopted. Id. at 304. AT&T was foreclosed at the time from offering unregulated services such as
data processing. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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that provided data processing services to use separate subsidiary
companies, subject to “maximum separation,” to ensure fair arms314
length dealing with the parent.
315
Connectivity issues go beyond nondiscrimination. A further
dimension concerns the free flow of data through the network. Paul
Baran, who developed the packet-switching technology that underlies
the Internet, recognized this problem early on. In a 1968 white paper
expanding on an article in Public Interest magazine, he argued that
“[a] new pronouncement by the regulatory agencies of a doctrine of
free interchange of signals across the boundaries of individual systems
316
would be of tremendous technological benefit.” Baran’s call for a
“doctrine of free exchange of signals” sounds eerily like the “freedom
to connect” that more recently became a mantra of both the noted
317
network policy analyst David Isenberg and Secretary of State
318
Hillary Clinton.
The computer utilities of the 1960s were private,
noninterconnected systems. The Internet, however, was designed
319
primarily for the purpose of universal interconnectivity.
A
technologist such as Baran, who straddled both efforts, could see that
the free flow of data was the ultimate technical and public policy
objective. But the FCC in the Computer Inquiries was focused more

314. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. These rules were modified in the
1980 Computer II decision, replaced with nonstructural safeguards in the 1986 Computer III
decision, and then effectively abandoned when the FCC classified broadband as an information
service in 2002, Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking)
(cable broadband); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019 (2002) (notice of proposed rulemaking) (DSL service).
315. See generally Werbach, supra note 83 (distinguishing between the concepts of
interconnection and nondiscrimination).
316. Baran, supra note 154, at 3.
317. See F2C: FREEDOM TO CONNECT, http://freedom-to-connect.net (last visited Apr. 12,
2011).
318. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (transcribing an interview in
which Secretary Clinton defined “the freedom to connect” as “the idea that governments should
not prevent people from connecting to the internet, to websites, or to each other”); Mark
Landler, Clinton Makes Case for Internet Freedom as a Plank of American Foreign Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A6 (“Her speech was the first in which a senior American official had
articulated a vision for making Internet freedom a plank of American foreign policy.”).
319. See Werbach, supra note 83, at 1250 (“The internet was devised to bridge different
networks . . . .”); Werbach, supra note 25, at 400–02 (“For those who created it, the Internet had
one paramount objective: it was designed to transport packets of data transparently across a
network of networks.”); supra Part II.D.
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on the regulation of carriers providing traditional telephone services
than on the development of the converged data processing market.
Interconnectivity was something that would develop, if at all, through
the functioning of the competitive market. The interconnectivity of
the Internet, however, was heavily influenced in its early days by
government involvement. And with the rise of cloud computing and
massive data aggregation platforms, the potential for fragmentation is
320
increasing.
2. Capacity and Robustness. Connectivity was not the only issue
before the FCC in Computer I. Nor is it the only important
consideration in the interface between network operators and
Internet-based services in 2011. Even if network operators do not
discriminate in their treatment of unaffiliated data processing
services, they could either provide insufficient capacity to support
those services or fail to offer the features and functions required. The
lead author of the SRI report to the FCC in the Computer I
proceeding stated that “[p]erhaps the most critical issue presented by
the computer inquiry is whether or not the telephone carriers are
going to be capable of meeting the rapidly growing demand for low321
cost data communications.” Such concerns are especially significant
in light of the rapid growth of the unregulated markets. Insufficient
network capacity could be a crippling blow to digital services looking
to cope with rapid scaling.
The FCC’s Computer I Final Decision and its subsequent
decisions did not impose any requirements on regulated carriers to
322
offer sufficient capacity and functionality. The FCC in its Computer

320. See Werbach, supra note 25, at 353–83 (“From the physical infrastructure that delivers
data across the globe to the content-based services that drive advertising and transactions, the
Internet is becoming a less uniform, less universal place.”).
321. Dunn, supra note 198, at 371.
322. The FCC later established the Open Network Architecture (ONA) process under
Computer III to encourage carriers and enhanced service providers to negotiate such
arrangements, but it was a failure. See Werbach, supra note 19, at 22–26 (describing how ONA
“proved contentious in practice” and was ultimately vacated by the Ninth Circuit in 1994).
The FCC’s decision not to impose service requirements on carriers to support datanetworking services parallels the NSF’s decision not to impose performance standards on the
Internet’s network access points when privatizing the NSFNet backbone. See Management of
NSFNET: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci. of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 102d
Cong. 80 (1992) (statement of Mitchell Kapor, President, Elec. Frontier Found., Chairman,
Commercial Internet Exch.) (“As the Internet was growing, the NSF wisely instituted an AUP
that allowed for a wide variety of uses of the network, including some that could strictly be
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I Tentative Decision stated that “the adequacy of present tariff
offerings of common carriers, and particularly the question of
interconnection, was the subject of considerable comment from many
323
Nonetheless, it essentially punted on
computer respondents.”
interconnection terms. The FCC committed to review tariff offerings
and to investigate concerns that data processing services were not
324
receiving sufficient capacity or needed functionality. It also noted
that two unrelated proceedings were causing changes in carrier tariffs
325
that would benefit the computer industry. In the Carterfone
proceeding, the FCC forced AT&T to allow users to connect any
326
devices they wished to the network. Around the same time, the
FCC began to require AT&T to interconnect its lines with MCI, then
327
a private microwave service operating in the Midwest. This decision
liberalized carrier interconnection tariffs, which could have meant
more flexibility in dealing with other systems, such as computer
utilities.
Considerations of capacity and robustness will be increasingly
important for the environment of cloud computing. Cloud providers
lack the industrial-strength equipment and long-standing commitment
to “five nines” reliability that are hallmarks of telephone network
328
operators. The Internet developed with a best-efforts culture, which
allowed for the cost savings and flexibility that contributed to its
success. As cloud computing platforms become the foundation for
major business activities, however, reliability becomes increasingly
important. Outages of major network platforms such as Gmail can
inconvenience millions of users and interrupt significant business

classified as ‘commercial.’ This open policy encouraged extensive use of the Internet and made
it a success.”).
323. Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 292 (1970).
324. See id. at 292–93 (highlighting “[f]ormal hearings” and “[i]nformal conferences” in
progress and a study commissioned by the National Academy of Sciences).
325. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968).
326. Id. at 423–24 (“[W]e . . . conclude that the tariff [barring the Carterfone] has been
unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful in the past, and that the provisions prohibiting the
use of customer-provided interconnecting devices should accordingly be striken [sic].”); see
Werbach, supra note 19, at 18–19 (“The FCC not only rejected the application of the Bell tariffs
to bar use of the Carterfone; it struck down all foreign attachment restrictions in those tariffs as
contrary to the public interest.”).
327. MCI eventually grew into the competitor with AT&T that forced the breakup.
328. “Five nines” refers to 99.999 percent uptime.
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329

activities. Twitter was so unreliable during its period of rapid
growth that it became known for the “fail whale” graphic that
330
appeared during its frequent outages.
In addition to these internal reliability and capacity issues, cloud
providers depend on sufficient capacity from communications
network operators. Virtualized server clusters may be easily scalable
as demand increases, but network ports and circuits are not. The
Comcast–Level 3 dispute arose, at least from Comcast’s perspective,
for precisely this reason. Comcast claimed that Level 3 suddenly
demanded additional ports into Comcast’s network and dramatically
increased its outbound traffic flow when it signed Netflix as a
331
customer. To Comcast, Level 3 was at fault for ramping up its
capacity demands suddenly. To Level 3, Comcast was at fault for
failing to provide the necessary capacity to bring Netflix’s traffic to
Comcast’s subscribers. The FCC will need to consider what role to
take in enhancing the reliability and robustness of increasingly
mission-critical networked services that depend on communications
networks.
3. Data Integrity and Privacy. The third category of issues
concerns what the data-networking services do with data. “Privacy”
does not do justice to the range of concerns about the informational
practices of cloud providers; “information governance” might be a
332
better term.
329. On May 14, 2009, an error in Google’s traffic routing resulted in the unavailability of all
Google services globally for two hours, which marked a fifteen-fold drop in global Internet
traffic. Ryan Singel, Google Fails Around the World Thursday Morning, WIRED EPICENTER
(May 14, 2009, 12:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/google-fails-around-theworld; Ryan Singel, When Google Goes Down, It Falls Hard, WIRED EPICENTER (May 14, 2009,
5:13 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/when-google-goes-down-it-goes-down-hard.
For a continuously updated collection of cloud services failures, see CLOUDFAIL.NET, http://
cloudfail.net (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
330. Rob Walker, A Successful Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 15, 2009, at 17, 17.
331. See Letter from Lynn Charytan, Vice President of Legal Regulatory Affairs, Comcast
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 3 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/
ecfs/document/view?id=7020924384 (“Level 3 contends that it is perfectly fair to shift all the
going-forward costs of sustaining exploding Internet growth onto one network in a two-network
arrangement.”).
332. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, Governing Networks, 27 BROOK. J.
INT’L. L. 819, 838–40 (2002) (“The informational, coordinative and competitive modes of policy
interdependence each pose governance challenges in decentralized regulatory systems.”);
Michael J. Madison, Information Governance, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 673,
676 (2009) (arguing that the notion of information governance includes “material, conceptual
and social” influences).

WERBACH IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

4/14/2011 6:24:49 PM

1834

[Vol. 60:1761

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Discussions about the computer utility in the 1960s frequently
333
raised concerns about personal data. As one 1967 monograph
stated, “Personally, the thought of a system that will record and store
information on what I purchased for how much at what time and place
everytime I purchase so much as a newspaper or candy bar frightens
334
me.” Numerous scholars and other experts identified privacy as an
independent rationale that might justify government regulation of
335
computer utilities. There were also concerns about security and data
integrity. If a user’s data were stored in a remote computer utility,
what assurance did the user have that the data would be maintained
336
properly?
Many similarities between such worries and contemporary
337
concerns about cloud service providers exist. Aggregation of vast
stores of data is one of the hallmarks of modern Internet leaders, such

333. See PARKHILL, supra note 154, at 149 (“How, then, in the day of the computer utility
are we to protect a citizen’s private files from surreptitious examination by overzealous public
officials?”).
334. Paul Armer, Social Implications of the Computer Utility 6 (RAND Paper Series, Paper
No. P-3642, 1967).
335. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 210 (1971); Jeffrey Meldman,
Centralized Information Systems and the Legal Right to Privacy, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 335, 335–36
(1968); Arthur R. Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (1972); see also Edward J. Grenier, Jr., Computers and
Privacy: A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 1970 DUKE L.J. 495, 496–97 (proposing a selfregulatory alternative to federal privacy regulation for the computer industry). See generally
The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of
Privacy of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 89th Cong. 2 (1966) (statement of Rep. Cornelius
E. Gallagher, Chairman, Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Operations) (“What we seek at this point is to create a climate of concern, in the hope that
guidelines can be set up which will protect the confidentiality of reports and prevent invasion of
individual privacy . . . .”); ANNETTE HARRISON, THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER
AGE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1967) (providing an annotated listing of over three
hundred publications relating to the problem of privacy and computers).
336. Security and integrity concerns back in the computer utility era bear substantial
similarities to today’s cloud computing environment. See, e.g., BARNETT, JR. ET AL., supra note
154, at 83–84 (“[P]erhaps the problem of most concern to a potential utility user is the security
of his data base held in the memory units of [the] utility system. Although this problem has been
solved conceptually, the solutions have not always enjoyed complete success in
implementation.”); see also Armer, supra note 334, at 13–14 (“Unauthorized access and copying
are more difficult matters, requiring much more work and inventiveness. . . . Computer-utility
personnel will include . . . system programmers. [They] are obviously in the most sensitive
position of all, for they ‘know all’ concerning the protective features built into the hardware and
software.”). Armer goes as far as to suggest that “[c]learly, we . . . need the equivalent of bank
examiners to insure the overall integrity of [the system].” Armer, supra note 334, at 14.
337. See Picker, supra note 274, at 9–11 (“[C]ontrol of users’ datastreams can implicate
privacy and competition concerns . . . .”).
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as Google and Facebook. What these and other providers can do
with personally identifiable information has become a major area of
339
concern. The Obama administration has begun an effort to examine
digital privacy issues, including the formation of an interagency task
force and reports from the Federal Trade Commission and the
340
Department of Commerce. Public policy activity in this area seems
bound to increase.
The FCC made privacy a significant element of its original
341
Computer I Notice of Inquiry. As it noted, “Privacy, particularly in
the area of communications, is a well established policy and objective
342
of the Communications Act.” The Communications Act includes
customer proprietary network information (CPNI) rules for

338. See, e.g., MARY MADDEN, SUSANNAH FOX, AARON SMITH & JESSICA VITAK, DIGITAL
FOOTPRINTS: ONLINE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND SEARCH IN THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY
2 (2007), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2007/PIP_Digital_
Footprints.pdf.pdf (noting the vast array of personal data stored online); Soghoian, supra note
249, at 361 (listing Google and Amazon.com as cloud services that provide customers with large
data storage capabilities); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2001) (noting Amazon.com’s
ability to keep track of customer purchases); Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Evolutionary Study
of Cloud Computing Services Privacy Terms, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 593, 595
(2010) (naming Yahoo! Mail, Google Docs, and Amazon EC2 as cloud services that “aggregate
large amounts of data”); Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines,
4 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1435 (2008) (“Google’s access to and storage of vast amounts of personal
information create a serious privacy problem . . . .”); Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership
on Facebook? Just Try Breaking Free, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at C1 (noting the difficulty of
removing private information from Facebook once it has been posted); Johann Cas, Privacy in
Pervasive Computing Environments—A Contradiction in Terms?, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG.,
Spring 2005, at 24, 25 (noting privacy concerns in developing pervasive computing systems).
339. See, e.g., Michael A. Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000);
Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin & Justin M. Grimes, Cloud Computing and Information Policy:
Computing in a Policy Cloud?, 5 J. INFO. TECH. & POL’Y 269 (2008); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving
to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway
Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27 (1995); Daniel J.
Solove, The Digital Person and the Future of Privacy, in PRIVACY AND IDENTITY: THE PROMISE
AND PERILS OF A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 3 (Katherine Strandburg ed., 2005); Bruce R. Wells,
The Fog of Cloud Computing: Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the Blurring of Online and
Offline Content, 12 J. CONST. L. 223 (2009); Couillard, supra note 277; Cloudy with a Chance of
Rain, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2010, at 6; Stephen H. Wildstrom, Google’s Gmail Is Great—But Not
for Privacy, BUS. WK., May 3, 2004, at 30; Jason Kincaid, Google Privacy Blunder Shares Your
Docs Without Permission, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 7, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/07/
huge-google-privacy-blunder-shares-your-docs-without-permission.
340. See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, F.T.C. Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online
Users, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A1 (discussing the FTC’s report and proposal to allow users
to opt out of behavioral tracking).
341. Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 15–17 (1966).
342. Id. at 16.
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telecommunications carriers, which limit the carriers’ ability to use
343
network management data for marketing purposes. The phone
company knows who its customers are calling, but it cannot sell that
information to a marketer or offer those customers a new product
based on the identity of their friends. Those CPNI rules did not apply
to unregulated data processing services. In Computer I, the FCC
considered whether it was appropriate to impose similar obligations
on how computer utilities handled customer data. At the same time as
the FCC addressed data privacy in Computer I, Congress held several
344
hearings on the topic.
In the end, the FCC declined to adopt any privacy requirements
345
in Computer I. The FCC was concerned that such action would
exceed its jurisdictional authority, and that it might be better
346
addressed by other agencies or Congress. Indeed, many dimensions
of privacy and information governance go beyond the expertise of the
FCC. There are some privacy-related questions, however, that
communications regulators are best situated to address. As danah
boyd and Professor Randal Picker observe, cloud computing
platforms bear many of the indicia of public utilities, such as
telephone companies, that are subject to special obligations in their
347
handling of user data.
Whether such obligations should extend to services such as
Facebook and Google is a debatable proposition. There are good
arguments that market forces or more targeted interventions may be
sufficient. Drawing a bright line between telephone companies

343. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2006) (“Except as required by law or with the approval of the
customer, a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary network
information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, disclose, or
permit access to individually identifiable [CPNI] in its provision of (A) the telecommunications
service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the
provision of such telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories.”).
344. See Davison et al., supra note 220, at 309–15 (discussing congressional action to protect
privacy in the computer field).
345. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 294–95 (1970) (noting that the
FCC would “give further consideration” to regulatory action regarding privacy needs);
McDonald, supra note 154, at 8 (noting that the FCC’s Computer decisions and the deregulatory
political environment kept computers from being federally regulated).
346. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 294–95 (“The privacy issue in its
broadest sense has numerous social and public policy implications which go well beyond the
pale of our jurisdiction over communications . . . .”).
347. See Picker, supra note 274, at 9–11 (discussing the effects of privacy restrictions on the
cable industry); boyd, Facebook Is a Utility, supra note 274 (arguing that Facebook is like a
utility and will likely be regulated).
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subject to stringent information privacy restrictions and other digital
data aggregators, however, creates an artificial distinction. Some of
those unregulated providers include cable operators competing in the
same broadband access market as the telephone companies; others
include platforms like Google Voice and Skype that are able to
collect user behavior data in the same manner as telephone
348
companies.
4. Transparency.
The final area for consideration is
transparency. In a way, Computer I was all about transparency. The
questions in the Notice of Inquiry largely concerned the terms and
conditions of services that carriers provided to data processing
349
providers.
Computer I was, in effect, the FCC’s way of
understanding marketplace conditions. The FCC did not adopt any
formal transparency mandate because it did not have to. The
regulated carriers were subject to tariffing requirements that
obligated them to disclose the terms and conditions of their offerings.
Those tariffs have gone by the wayside, however, and unregulated
computer-based services have never had to file them.
The FCC adopted a transparency mandate in its Open Internet
350
Order. It added this principle, along with a nondiscrimination rule,
to the four consumer-protection principles it had articulated in 2005.
The Comcast-BitTorrent imbroglio demonstrated how the lack of
transparency about broadband access networks’ practices could
create confusion and uncertainty. Comcast imposed a network
management system that disadvantaged peer-to-peer file sharing, but
neither customers, nor other services providers, were aware of its
351
terms. Comcast itself often seemed unclear about what it was doing,
348. For a comparison between VoIP and legacy voice services, see Dong Hee Shin, VoIP:
A Debate Over Information Service or Telephone Application in US: A New Perspective in
Convergence Era, 23 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 57, 59–61 (2006); and see also Daniel B.
Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P. Harris, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the
Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 105–08 (2005).
349. Computer I NOI, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 7–15 (1966).
350. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1,
31–32 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order) (adopting a universal transparency requirement for
mobile broadband).
351. The FCC was particularly harsh on Comcast’s choice to keep its network management
practices secret from its customers. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd.
13,028, 13,059 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600
F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough Comcast eventually disclosed some elements of its
network management practices to customers, Comcast’s first reaction to allegations of
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perhaps because its engineers and lawyers were not communicating
internally. One of the FCC’s requirements in its 2008 order
sanctioning Comcast was that the company file a report detailing the
352
practices it had engaged in. Comcast also had to file a description of
the new, protocol-agnostic network-management system it had
353
adopted instead. The company did so, even while successfully
354
challenging the legal authority for the FCC’s actions.
Comcast’s disclosure of both its discriminatory practices and its
replacement network management approach created a learning
experience for the company, the FCC, and the industry. Engineers
knew that peer-to-peer systems and other developments were
straining broadband networks, especially the shared last-mile systems
of cable operators. The degree of the problem and the efficacy of
solutions, however, were difficult to gauge when companies kept
mum about their actual experiences. The Comcast order, however,
was a one-time requirement for a specific situation. A more universal
transparency requirement might help prevent and resolve similar
355
disputes in the future.
The Comcast–Level 3 dispute illustrates the perils of a
nontransparent environment. The terms of Comcast’s business
relationship with Level 3, as with all of its backbone peering and
356
transit contracts, are private. Comcast’s decision to impose new

discriminatory treatment was not honesty, but at best misdirection and obfuscation. If Comcast
actually believed its practices were reasonable, it should not have behaved in this manner. A
hallmark of whether something is reasonable is whether a provider is willing to disclose to its
customers what it is doing. To the extent that Comcast wishes to employ capacity limits in the
future, it should disclose those to customers in clear terms.”).
352. Id. at 13,059–60; see also Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Comcast
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/
ecfs/document/view?id=6520169715 (describing Comcast’s network management practices, in
compliance with the FCC order).
353. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge, 23 FCC Rcd. at 13,059–60; see
also Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Comcast Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch,
Sec’y, FCC 1 (Jan. 5, 2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=
6520192582 (reporting that Comcast had discontinued and replaced the network management
practices for which it was censured).
354. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d at 644 (vacating the 2008 order).
355. Gerald Faulhaber & David Farber, The Open Internet: A Customer-Centric Framework,
4 INT’L. J. COMM. 302, 315–16 (2010); Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking
Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 530–31
(2009).
356. For an explanation of the moral hazard that undisclosed peering agreements entail, the
opportunistic behavior they may spur, and how information asymmetry between the principal
and agent can be taken advantage of by the agent, see COSTAS COURCOUBETIS & RICHARD
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usage-based charges on Level 3 would never have even entered the
realm of policy discussion had Level 3 not gone public. Both parties
engaged in a pattern of strategic partial disclosures to advance their
claims. There is no neutral way to ascertain the economics and the
typicality of the Comcast–Level 3 arrangement.
There are sometimes business reasons to keep a negotiation
confidential. In the case of network interconnection, however, the
strategic value seems limited, at least in light of the benefits of
disclosure. Large networks have often kept their backbone-peering
terms confidential, and they have even subjected those with whom
357
they are interconnected to nondisclosure agreements. Comcast is
actually one of the more liberal companies on that score, posting its
358
peering terms on a public website.
Transparency creates ancillary benefits as well. Transparency
about standards and protocols will push toward greater portability of
data across cloud platforms. This portability would benefit users and
would create new opportunities for innovation. Furthermore,
network researchers have lacked comprehensive data on Internet
359
traffic flows since the NSF privatized the Internet backbone. If the
FCC promotes the open dissemination of data through standard
formats, researchers can apply this data to many other problems.
Furthermore, the mere knowledge that business arrangements and
internal technical practices may be made public can influence
corporate behavior. Companies will be less likely to employ

WEBER, PRICING COMMUNICATION NETWORKS: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND
MODELLING 286–87 (2003); and see also Ioanna D. Constantiou & Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos,
Towards Sustainable Quality of Service in Interconnection Agreements: Implications from
Information Asymmetry, ECIS 2001 PROC. 865, 866 (2001) (same).
357. See Kende, supra note 95, at 56 (referring to the nondisclosure agreements that cover
contracts between backbones); Werbach, supra note 25, at 370 (noting the confidential nature of
peering agreements).
358. See Press Release, Comcast Corp., supra note 98 (describing Comcast’s agreement with
Level 3).
359. See KIMBERLY CLAFFY, CAIDA, TEN THINGS LAWYERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE
INTERNET 2 (2008), available at http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2008/lawyers_top_ten/
lawyers_top_ten.pdf (noting that the current legal framework constrains researchers’ access to
adequate information to conduct accurate analyses); Sascha D. Meinrath & kc claffy, The
COMMONS Initiative: Cooperative Measurement and Modeling of Open Networked Systems, 16
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 407, 411 (2008) (same); Colleen Shannon, David Moore, Ken Keys,
Marina Fomenkov, Bradley Huffaker & k claffy, The Internet Measurement Data Catalog, ACM
SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV., Oct. 2005, at 97, 98 (2005) (“One of the most
fundamental problems remains access to current data.”).
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questionable network management practices if they know their
actions will become public.
CONCLUSION
The task for the FCC and, ultimately, Congress, is to formulate a
regulatory program that promotes wealth creation, innovation, and
civic values in the novel environment of converged communications
and computing. The choices first made in Computer I continue to
influence public policy for network industries. Quarantining data
services from regulation and attempting to police the dividing line is
an increasingly treacherous proposition. Internet-based digital
services should not be subject to the strictures of traditional common
carrier regulation, but they do raise a series of important policy
considerations. The FCC’s emphasis on regulatory questions relating
to broadband access masked an evolution of the Internet toward
more centralized platforms. The basic public policy challenge for the
FCC will not be the choice between regulation and deregulation, or
between closed and open networks. It will be to translate the age-old
concept of public utilities into the contemporary environment of
cloud computing.

